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With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation
on the Rise, What about Marital Rights
for Unmarried Partners?*
Lawrence W. Waggoner**
This article draws attention to a cultural shift in the formation of families
that has been and is taking place in this country and in the developed
world.
Part I uses recent government data to trace the decline of marriage and
the rise of cohabitation in the United States. Between 2000 and 2010, the
population grew by 9.71%, but the husband and wife households only
grew by 3.7%, while the unmarried couple households grew by 41.4%. A
counter-intuitive finding is that the early 21st century data show little correlation between the marriage rate and economic conditions.
Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015),
same-sex marriage is now universally available to same-sex couples. Part
I considers the impact of same-sex marriage on the marriage rate. Part I
then describes the benefits and obligations of marriage and closes by noting the demographic characteristics of cohabiting couples. The article
points out that cohabitation is a temporary or short-term state in most
cases: The parties either break up or get married fairly quickly. Nevertheless, a small percentage of cohabiting couples continue to cohabit for
much longer or for life. Because more are added every year, these cohabitations accumulate in the population.
Part II discusses how the case law has addressed the rights and obligations of cohabiting couples when they break up. Titled From Contract to
Status, this Part starts with the enforcement of contracts between the parties, then moves to the right of plaintiffs when they do not allege or cannot
prove a contract. One route to recovery would be common-law marriage,
but that concept was abolished by late-19th century statutes in almost
every American jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in states that have abolished
common-law marriage, cases exist in which the court awarded damages to
* An abridged version of this article will appear in a symposium on cohabitation
published in the Summer 2016 issue of the Family Law Quarterly.
** Lewis M. Simes Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan. For commenting on earlier drafts, I thank David Chambers, Bruce Frier, and John Langbein.
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the plaintiff based on status, i.e., in which the court described the couple’s
relationship as a marriage in all but name.
Part III argues the case for treating cohabiting couples whose relationship
shows that they are (or were) deeply committed to one another as married
in fact. The article finds that a consensus of sorts has quietly emerged in
legislation to this effect that has been enacted or introduced in the United
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. In this country, the
American Law Institute (ALI) has recognized that longer-term cohabitants have rights similar to married couples upon dissolution of the relationship. Drawing on the UK and Commonwealth statutes, the ALI
proposal, and the case law described in Part II, the article presents for
discussion a draft De Facto Marriage Act. The Draft Act, however, along
with the Commonwealth statutes and the ALI proposal, does not, and
probably should not, provide a mechanism for automatically declaring a
couple as married in fact. Couples who deliberately decline to marry
should not have their decision overridden. Consequently, the Draft Act is
not set up to be self-executing. A court judgment is required.
The article concludes by pointing out that a de facto marriage judgment
would qualify a couple for all federal as well as state benefits and obligations of marriage.
I. THE CULTURAL SHIFT IN THE FORMATION OF FAMILIES .
A. The Decline of Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Rise of Cohabitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Impact of Same-Sex Marriage on the Marriage
Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. The Benefits, Rights, and Obligation of Marriage . . . .
E. Longer-Term Cohabitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. CASE LAW: FROM CONTRACT TO STATUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Recovery Based on Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Recovery Based on Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Common-Law Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. In States that Have Abolished Common-Law
Marriage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. A UNIFORM DE FACTO MARRIAGE ACT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE CULTURAL SHIFT
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FAMILIES

A. The Decline of Marriage
Between 1867 and 1967, the annual marriage rate changed
little: 0.96% of the population married in 1867 and 0.97% in
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1967.1 In the intervening years, the rated dipped as low as 0.79% during
the Great Depression in 1932 and spiked up to 1.46% when the troops
came home after the end of World War II.2 The annual percentage during ninety of these years ranged between 0.85% and 1.14%.3
By 2000, the marriage rate had declined to 0.82%. The rate continued to spiral downward, reaching an historic low of slightly less than
0.68% in 2009. From 2009 to 2012, the latest years for which marriagerate statistics are available, the marriage rate stabilized at that historically low rate of slightly less than 0.68%:4
TABLE 1
Number of Marriages, Marriage and Unemployment Rates,
Gross Domestic Product: 2000-20125
Unemployment
Rate of Those
Seeking
Employment6

Gross Domestic
Product in
Billions of
Chained 2009
Dollars7

Year

Number
of
Marriages

Population

Percentage of
the Population
Getting
Married

2000

2,315,000

281,421,906

0.82261

4.0%

$12,559.7

2001

2,326,000

284,968,955

0.81623

4.7%

$12,682.2

2002

2,290,000

287,625,193

0.79618

5.8%

$12,908.8

2003

2,245,000

290,107,933

0.77385

6.0%

$13,271.1

1 See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DHEW Pub. No. (HRA) 741902, 100 YEARS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS UNITED STATES, 1867-1967, at
7 (Vital Health Statistics Series 21, No. 24, 1973).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Demographic Intelligence, a consulting firm that claims that its demographic
forecasts are 99% accurate, predicts: “The United State marriage rate . . . is poised to go
lower . . . .” U.S. Marriage Rate Lowest Ever Recorded, But Headed Down Slower,
PRWEB, at 1 (May 19, 2015), http://www.prweb.com/pdfdownload/12729717.pdf [hereinafter DEMOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE].
5 The first four columns are based on the 2000-2012 marriage-rate table in National
Marriage and Divorce Rate Trends, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/marriage_divorce_tables.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2016), See also
Isabel V. Sawhill, Opinion, Beyond Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/09/14/opinion/sunday/beyond-marriage.html?_r=1 (“Marriage is
disappearing.”).
6 See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, U.S. DEP’T OF
LAB., BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNU04000000?years
_option=all_years&periods_option=specific_periods&periods=Annual+Data (last visited
Jan. 20, 2016).
7 See National Economic Accounts: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), U.S. DEP’T OF
COM., BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, http://bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp (last visited
Jan. 20, 2016).
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2004

2,279,000

292,805,298

0.77833

5.5%

$13,773.5

2005

2,249,000

295,516,599

0.76104

5.1%

$14,234.2

2,193,000
2006 (excludes 294,077,247
Louisiana)

0.74572

4.6%

$14,613.8

2007

2,197,000

301,231,207

0.72934

4.6%

$14,873.7

2008

2,157,000

304,093,966

0.70932

5.8%

$14,830.4

2009

2,080,000

306,771,529

0.67803

9.3%

$14,418.7

2010

2,096,000

308,745,538

0.67888

9.6%

$14,738.8

2011

2,118,000

311,591,917

0.67974

8.9%

$15,020.6

2012

2,131,000

313,914,040

0.67885

8.1%

$15,354.6

Although the marriage rate dipped substantially during the Great
Depression of the 1930s, a counter-intuitive finding is that the early 21st
century data in Table 1 show little correlation between the marriage rate
and economic conditions. The marriage rate was declining long before
the 2008-09 recession and declined at only a slightly accelerated pace
during the second year of that recession. Just as the 2009-2012 marriage
rate stabilized, the unemployment rate spiked up from below 6.0% to
over 9.0% despite improvement in the gross domestic product. These
data points do not mean that a dramatically improved economy sometime in the future might not correlate with a rising marriage rate, but
that cannot now be known. So far though, current data show that the
2015 unemployment rate for those in the likely first-marriage ages—the
millennials (18- to 34-year-olds)—is down to 7.7%, but that has not led
them to form more households than they did before the recession
began.8
Analyzing U.S. Census data, the Pew Research Center found that
“[i]n 1960, 72% of all adults age 18 and older were married; [in 2010,]
just 51% are.”9 The Center also found that “just 20% of adults ages 18
to 29 are married, compared with 59% in 1960, [though it] is not yet
known whether today’s young adults are abandoning marriage or
8 See Richard Fry, More Millennials Living With Family Despite Improved Job
Market, PEW RES. CTR. (2015), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2015/07/2015-0729_young-adult-living_FINAL.pdf.
9 D’Vera Cohn et al., Barely Half of U.S. Adults Are Married—A Record Low,
PEW RES. CTR., at 1 (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf [hereinafter PEW: Less than Half Are Married]. See also The Decline of
Marriage and Rise of New Families, PEW RES. CTR., at 1 (Paul Taylor ed., 2010), http://
www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/11/pew-social-trends-2010-families.pdf [hereinafter
PEW: The Decline of Marriage & Rise of New Families] (“About half (52%) of all adults
in this country were married in 2008; back in 1960, seven-in-ten (72%) were.”).
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merely delaying it.”10 The Center also found that “[p]ublic opinion
about marriage echoes the declining prevalence of marriage. In a 2010
Pew Research Center survey, about four-in-ten Americans (39%) said
they agree that marriage as an institution is becoming obsolete.11 Back
in the 70s, only 28% agreed with that premise. . . . However, attitudes
toward the institution of marriage do not always match personal wishes
about getting married. Asked whether they want to get married, 47% of
unmarried adults who agree that marriage is becoming obsolete say that
they would like to wed.”12
B. The Rise of Cohabitation
As the marriage rate has declined, the cohabitation rate has risen.13
According to the latest Census Bureau report, “the unmarried partner
population numbered 7.7 million in 2010 and grew 41% between 2000
and 2010.”14

10

PEW: Less than Half Are Married, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 10.
12 Id. at 10-11.
13 See The State of Our Unions: Marriage in America 2012, NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT AT THE UNIV. OF VA. & INST. FOR AM. VALUES, at 64 (2012), http://stateofourunions.org/2012/SOOU2012.pdf [hereinafter MARRIAGE IN AMERICA] (“The decline in
marriage does not mean that people are giving up on living together with a sexual partner. On the contrary, with the incidence of unmarried cohabitation increasing rapidly,
marriage is giving ground to unwed unions.”); see id. at 76 (“For many, cohabitation is a
prelude to marriage, for others simply an alternative to living alone, and for a small but
growing number it is considered an alternative to marriage.”); Tavia Simmons & Martin
O’Connell, Census 2000 Special Reports: Married-Couple and Unmarried Partner Households: 2000, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 1 (2003), http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/
censr-5.pdf; PEW: The Decline of Marriage & Rise of New Families, supra note 9, at 66-67;
DEMOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE, supra note 4, at 1 (“Cohabitation has emerged as a competitor to marriage, insofar as it offers intimacy and the opportunity to have children
without requiring the same level of commitment.”); See also PEW: Less than Half Are
Married, supra note 9, at 1.
14 See Daphne Lofquist et al., Households and Families: 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 3 (Apr. 2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf.
11

5,475,768
4,881,377
594,391

Unmarried Couple Households:
Opposite-Sex Partner
Same-Sex partner

7,744,711
6,842,714
901,997

23,588,377
32,922,268

56,510,377

Number

6.6
5.9
0.8

20.2
28.2

48.4

Percent of
All
Households

2010

+2,268,943
+1,961,337
+307,606

-1,247,237
+3,246,382

+2,017,145

Number

41.4
40.2
51.8

-5.0
11.0

3.7

Percent
Change

Change in Numbers,
2000 to 2010
ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

16

Id. at 5 tbl.2.
The Census Bureau defines a “household” as consisting of “all of the people who occupy a housing unit.” Id. at 4.
17 The Census Bureau defines a “family” as a household that consists of “a householder and one or more other people living in the same
household who are related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption.” Id.
18 The Census Bureau defines “own children” as consisting of “biological, adopted, and stepchildren of the householder who are under
18.” Id.

15

23.5
28.1

24,835,505
29,657,727
5.2
4.6
0.6

51.7

54,493,232

Number

Percent of
All
Households16

2000

Husband and Wife Family
Households:17
With Own Children18
Without Own Children

Household Type

TABLE 2
Households by Type: 2000 and 201015
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In 2000, husband and wife households represented 51.7% of all
households and 75.9% of family households.19 By 2010, though, the
number of husband and wife households increased by 3.7%, but
dropped to 48.4% of all households and 72.9% of family households.20
Unmarried couple households represented 5.2% of all households
in 2000 and increased to 6.6% of all households by 2010.21 In 2000, opposite-sex partner households represented 4.6% of all households and
89.1% of unmarried-couple households.22 By 2010, opposite-sex partner
household rose by 40.2% in numbers and to 5.9% of all households and
88.4% of unmarried-couple households.23 Same-sex partner households
represented 0.6% of all households and 10.9% of unmarried-partner
households in 2000.24 By 2010, the number of same-sex partner households rose by 51.8% and to 0.8% of all households; they rose slightly to
11.6% of unmarried-partner households.25
FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE INCREASE

FROM

2000

TO

2010

Source: Tables 1 & 2
45%

41.40%

40%
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%

9.71%
3.70%

5%
0%
Population

Husband-Wife
Households

Unmarried-Couple
Households

As illustrated by Figure 1, the population grew by 9.71% between
2000 and 2010. By contrast, the husband and wife households only grew
by 3.7%, but the unmarried couple households grew by 41.4%. The husband and wife households also declined as a percentage of all house19
20
21
22
23
24
25

See id. at 5 tbl.2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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holds and of family households.26 Unmarried couple households,
opposite-sex partner households, and same-sex partner households rose
in both numbers and percentages of all households.
FIGURE 2: 2000 & 2010 UNMARRIED PARTNERS
Source: Table 2
9,000,000

901,997
Same Sex

8,000,000
7,000,000
6,000,000

594,391
Same Sex

5,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,000
2,000,000

4,881,377
Opposite
Sex

6,842,714
Opposite
Sex

1,000,000
0
2000

2010

Figure 2 pictures the degree to which opposite-sex partner households outnumber same-sex partner households.27 Although the ratio
dropped from 8.2 to 1 in 2000 to 7.6 to 1 in 2010, the ratio should widen
as a certain percentage of same-sex couples shift to marriage.
Children are present in many unmarried couple households. In a
report by a group of family scholars, the authors noted:
In the latter half of the twentieth century, divorce posed the
biggest threat to marriage in the United States. . . . No
More. . . . Today, the rise of cohabiting households with children is the largest unrecognized threat to the quality and stability of children’s family lives. . . . Now, approximately 24
percent of the nation’s children are born to cohabiting couples,
26

For the definitions of “household” and “family,” see id. at 4.
For more statistics, see Statistics, UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.unmarried
.org/statistics (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). Unmarried Equality, formerly known as The
Alternatives to Marriage Project, is an advocacy group for rights of the unmarried. According to their mission statement, “Unmarried Equality (UE) advocates for equality
and fairness for unmarried people, including people who are single, choose not to marry,
cannot marry, or live together before marriage. . . . Unmarried Equality is not opposed
to marriage. But we believe that unmarried relationships also deserve validation and
support.” Unmarried Equality Mission Statement, UNMARRIED EQUALITY http://www
.unmarried.org/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
27
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which means that more children are currently born to cohabiting couples than to single mothers.28
Of all households counted in the 2010 census, 5.9% were unmarried
opposite-sex couple households and 2.3% were unmarried opposite-sex
couple households with own children.29 Unmarried same-sex couple
households made up 0.6% of all households, and those with own children 0.1%.30 Stated another way, 39% of unmarried opposite-sex
couple households had own children present and 17% of unmarried
same-sex couple households had own children present.31
C. The Impact of Same-Sex Marriage on the Marriage Rate
The Supreme Court has now spoken. In Obergefell v. Hodges,32 the
Court held that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry,
saying,
[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.
28

W. BRADFORD WILCOX ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY CONCLUFROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6 (Broadway Publishing, 3d ed. 2011). On the effect
of cohabitation on the children, see CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF
WHITE AMERICA, 1960 – 2010 165 (Crown Forum 2012) (“If you are interested in the
welfare of children, knowing that the child was born to a cohabitating woman instead of a
lone unmarried woman should have little effect on your appraisal of the child’s chances
in life.”); Wendy D. Manning, Cohabitation and Child Wellbeing, 25 MARRIAGE & CHILD
WELL BEING 51, 59 (2015), http://www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/
Cohabitation.pdf (“[S]table cohabiting two biological parent families seem to offer many
of the same health, cognitive, and behavioral benefits that stable married biological parent families provide. ”).
29 Daphne Lofquist et al., supra note 14 at 8.
30 See id.
31 By another count, 19% of same-sex couples are raising biological, step, or
adopted children. See Gary J. Gates, LGBT Parenting in the United States, THE WILLIAMS INST. (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBTParenting.pdf. For a vast literature on children of same-sex couples, see Catherine Smith,
Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 1590
(2013); Courtney G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the Well-Being
of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81, 87-88 (2011); Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of
Same-Sex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage Presumption, 44 FAM. CT.
REV. 74, 74 (2006); Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex
Marriage from the Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411, 424
(1999); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of All Children: Opponents and Supporters of
Same-Sex Marriage Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y.C. L. REV. 573, 573 (2005); Sam Castic,
The Irrationality of a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex
Couples, 3 MOD. AM. 3, 3 (2007).
32 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

SIONS
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The Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the
fundamental right to marry.33
A Gallup Poll taken shortly before the Supreme Court decided
Obergefell found that 60% of Americans support legalization of samesex marriage; that figure is up from 55% in 2014 and is the highest approval that Gallup has found on the question.34 One demographer
found “no evidence that allowing same-sex couples to marry reduces the
opposite-sex marriage rate.”35
Before Obergefell, same-sex marriage was legal in thirty-seven
states and the District of Columbia.36 The movement toward legalization started with the 2003 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.37 In
twenty-five of the thirty-seven states, same-sex marriage was legalized
by state or federal judicial decision,38 eleven and the District of Colum-

33 Id. at 2604; see Davis v. Miller, 136 S. Ct. 23 (2015) (denying a petition by a
Kentucky county clerk to be allowed to refuse to issue marriage licenses on the ground of
her religious beliefs against same-sex marriage).
34 See Justin McCarthy, Record-High 60% of Americans Support Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP (May 19, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/183272/record-high-ameri
cans-support-sex-marriage.aspx?utm_source=Social%20Issues&utm_medium=newsfeed
&utm_campaign=tiles (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). For a similar result, see Karlyn Bowman, Public Opinion on Same-Sex Marriage: Anatomy of a Change, AM. ENTER. INST.
(June 1, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://www.aei.org/publication/public-opinion-on-same-sex-marriage-anatomy-of-a-change/.
35 Marcus Dillender, The Death of Marriage? The Effects of New Forms of Legal
Recognition on Marriage Rates in the United States, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 563, 565 (2014).
36 For an exact time line, see Same Sex Marriage Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEG., (June 26, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/same-sex-marriagelaws.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). Internationally, twenty countries have legalized
same-sex marriage: Ireland (2015), Finland (2015), Luxembourg (2014), Scotland (2014),
England and Wales (2013), Brazil (2013), France (2013), New Zealand (2013), Uruguay
(2013), Denmark (2012), Argentina (2010), Portugal (2010), Iceland (2010), Sweden
(2009), Norway (2009), South Africa (2006), Spain (2005), Canada (2005), Belgium
(2003), and The Netherlands (2000). In Mexico, Mexico City (2009) and the states of
Quintana Roo (2011) and Coahuila (2014) have legalized same-sex marriage. See Gay
Marriage Around the World, PEW RES. CTR., at 2 – 8 (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewfo
rum.org/2015/06/26/gay-marriage-around-the-world-2013/?utm_source=Pew+Research+
Center&utm_campaign=1e18492f80-Same_sex_decision_newsletter_June_266–26_26_
2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-1e18492f80-399818005 (last visited
Jan. 20, 2016).
37 798 N.E.2d 941, 1005 (Mass. 2003).
38 Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, New York, New Jersey, Nevada, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 36.
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bia by legislation,39 and one by state voter approved ballot proposal.40
Based on Census 2010 data, the Census Bureau initially estimated that
25.6% of same-sex partners were married, but later issued a lower revised estimate of 20%.41 In terms of numbers, the Census Bureau initially estimated that there were 251,695 same-sex married couples in
2013, but later revised its estimate downward, finding the number to be
170,429;42 the discrepancy was attributed to opposite sex married
couples checking the wrong gender box by mistake on the survey questionnaire.43 Because these figures were compiled when same-sex marriage was becoming more available but not yet universally available (as
it is as of June 26, 2015), the figures might not be a reliable predictor of
the long-term marriage or non-marriage habits of same-sex partners.
D. The Benefits, Rights, and Obligations of Marriage
Marriage carries significant psychological,44 health,45 and financial benefits. Marriage also creates federal and state rights, obliga46

39 Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington. See Same-Sex Marriage Laws, supra
note 36.
40 Maine. See id.
41 See Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Same-Sex Married Couples, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn181.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
42 See Daphne Lofquist, Using Names to Improve Measurement of Same-sex Married
Couples in the American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, at 1, 9, 15 (2015),
http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2015/demo/2015-Lofquist-01-Abstract.pdf.
43 See id. at 9, 15 tbl.4; see also D’Vera Cohn, How many same-sex married couples
in the U.S.? Maybe 170,000, PEW RES. CTR., at 1 (June 24, 2015), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2015/06/24/how-many-same-sex-married-couples-in-the-u-s-maybe-170000/
?utm_source=Pew+Research+Center&utm_campaign=6f9a4ee826-June_25_2015_News
letter6_24_2015&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_3e953b9b70-6f9a4ee826-399818005
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
44 See, e.g., The Heritage Found., The Benefits of Marriage, FAMILYFACTS, http://
www.familyfacts.org/briefs/1/the-benefits-of-marriage.org (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
45 See, e.g., id.; Michael S. Rendall et al., The Protective Effect of Marriage for Survival: A Review and Update, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 481, 481 (2011) (“[W]e find a consistent
survival advantage for married over unmarried men and women, and an additional survival ‘premium’ for married men.”); Andrew Hess & Glenn T. Stanton, The Health Benefits of Marriage, FOCUS ON THE FAMILY (Sept. 2012), http://www.focusonthefamily.com/
about_us/focus-findings/marriage/health-benefits-of-marriage.aspx (last visited Jan. 20,
2016).
46 See, e.g., Jonathan Vespa & Matthew A. Painter II, Cohabitation History, Marriage, and Wealth Accumulation, 48 DEMOGRAPHY 983, 983 (2011) (“Over time, marriage
positively correlates with wealth accumulation.”); Lisen Stromberg, What’s Love Got to
Do With It? The Financial Benefits of Marriage, MONEY UNDER 30 (Apr. 4, 2013), http://
www.moneyunder30.com/financial-benefits-of-marriage (last visited Jan. 20, 2016); Mar-
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tions, and immunities47—including social security,48 taxation,49 spousalcommunication-and-testimonial-privileges,50 obligation of support,51 the
right to a property settlement and perhaps alimony in divorce,52 a large
intestate share for a surviving spouse,53 and protection against disinheririage Rights and Benefits, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/marriagerights-benefits-30190.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
47 In Obergefell, the Supreme Court listed the benefits and obligations of marriage
as including “taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate succession;
spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital access; medical decision making authority; adoption rights; the rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’ compensation benefits;
health insurance; and child custody, support, and visitation rules.” Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
48 See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SURVIVOR BENEFITS 5 (2015), http://www.socialsecurity
.gov/pubs/EN-05-10084.pdf.
49 Joint income tax return (I.R.C. § 1(a)) and estate and gift tax marital deduction
(I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523). The income tax, however, also has marriage penalties. See CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, For Better or Worse: Marriage and the Federal Income Tax, at 1 (1997),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/marriage.pdf.
The Tax Policy Center offers a Marriage Tax Calculator. See Marriage Bonus and Penalty
Tax Calculator, TAX POL’Y CTR., http://taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/marriagepenaltycalculator.cfm (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). Obtaining a divorce for the sole purpose of
filing tax returns as unmarried individuals is forbidden if, at the time of the divorce, the
divorced individuals intend to and do remarry in the next tax year. See Your Federal
Income Tax for Individuals, I.R.S. Pub. No. 17 at 20 (2014).
50 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 970-71 (West 2015) (establishing the privilege not
to testify against spouse and the privilege not to be called as a witness against spouse).
51 See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 16/15 (2015).
52 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 552.101-.103 (2015). See generally Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
53 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). A few states,
by statute, bar the surviving spouse from taking for desertion or adultery. See, e.g., KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 392.090 (West 2015) (spouse barred if spouse “leaves the other and
lives in adultery,” unless the spouses “afterward become reconciled and live together as
husband and wife”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:19 (2015) (spouse barred “if at the time
of the death of either husband or wife, the decedent was justifiably living apart from the
surviving husband or wife because such survivor was or had been guilty of conduct which
constitutes cause for divorce”); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-1.2(5)-(6) (McKinney 2015) (spouse barred if spouse “abandoned the deceased spouse, and such abandonment continued until the time of death” or if the spouse “who, having the duty to support
the other spouse, failed or refused to provide for such spouse though he or she had the
means or ability to do so, unless such marital duty was resumed and continued until the
death of the spouse having the need of support”); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2106(a) (2015)
(spouse barred “who, for one year or upwards previous to the death of the other spouse,
has willfully neglected or refused to perform the duty to support the other spouse, or who
for one year or upwards has willfully and maliciously deserted the other spouse”); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64.1-16.3(A) (2015) (spouse barred if spouse “willfully deserts or abandons
his or her spouse and such desertion or abandonment continues until the death of the
spouse”).
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tance via a right to elect a forced share.54 In community property states,
property acquired during marriage other than by gift or inheritance is
community property and is owned fifty-fifty by each married partner.
Under Obergefell, these benefits are now available in all states and in
most and perhaps all U.S. Territories55 to same-sex couples who decide
to get married,56 not just in the thirty-seven states in which same-sex
marriage had previously been legalized.
Pre-Obergefell, several states in which same-sex marriage was prohibited provided mechanisms by which same-sex couples could gain
most or all state but not federal marital benefits by registering as domestic partners or as reciprocal beneficiaries or by entering into civil unions.57 The Census Bureau estimated that, as of 2010, 169,205 same-sex

A few courts, without statutory authority to vary the rights provided to surviving
spouses, have denied claims against decedents’ estates by persons who were lawfully married to the decedents when they died. See, e.g., Estate of Abila, 197 P.2d 10, 11 (Cal.
1948) (wife barred because interlocutory decree of divorce, granted to decedent before
his death, terminated decedent’s obligation of support, though it did not dissolve the
marriage).
54 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to 2-214 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
55 See Omar Gonzalez-Pagan, No Same-Sex Couple Left Behind: SCOTUS Ruling
for the Freedom to Marry Would Apply with Equal Force to U.S. Territories, LAMBDA
LEGAL (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20150424_scotus-ruling-wouldapply-to-us-territories (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). The five U.S. Territories are Puerto
Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. Individuals born in American Samoa, unlike individuals born in the other four
territories, are not U.S. citizens; they are U.S. nationals. See id. The equal protection
and due process clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution applies to “citizens of the United States.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
56 Regarding federal benefits, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Attorney General Lynch
Announces Federal Marriage Benefits Available to Same-Sex Couples Nationwide, JUSTICE NEWS (July 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-lynch-announces-federal-marriage-benefits-available-same-sex-couples (last visited Jan. 20, 2016);
Supreme Court Decision Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (July 9, 2015),
http://blog.socialsecurity.gov/2015/07/09/supreme-court-decision-regarding-same-sexmarriage/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016); Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. Regarding
state and federal benefits, see Tara Siegel Bernard, What the Same-Sex Marriage Decision
Means for Couples’ Rights and Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2015, updated June 26,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/15/your-money/the-same-sex-marriage-decisionwhats-at-stake-for-couples.html?_r=0.
57 For a list of states, see Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civilunions-and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). Some of the
domestic-partner statutes allowed some or all opposite-sex couples to register as well.
For federal tax purposes, civil unions, domestic partnerships, and other similar formal
relationships are not marriages, because state law does not “denominate [these relationships] as . . . marriage[s].” See Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201, 204.
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couples had done so.58 Shortly after Connecticut, Delaware, New
Hampshire, and Rhode Island legalized same-sex marriage, those states
enacted legislation that automatically converts then-existing civil unions
into marriages,59 instantly entitling the parties to all federal and state
marital benefits.60
Because marriage has now become available to all same-sex
couples and marriages in one state must now be recognized in all states,
and because of the one-time conversion to marriage of civil-union
couples, the overall marriage rate is certain to rise,61 but how substantial
the long-term boost will be is hard to predict.62 The latest data on the
overall marriage-rate and for the number of unmarried same-sex partners are for 2010.63 Since same-sex marriage began to become available
in Massachusetts in 2003, and had become increasingly available even
before Obergefell,64 the number of marriages represented in Table 1
from 2003 forward included some same-sex marriages, but the exact
numbers for each year are not known. If all of the unmarried same-sex
partners could have and had gotten married in 2010, an unlikely event,
the marriage rate would have risen sharply, from 0.67% to 0.97%.65 It is
predictable that Obergefell will unleash a degree of pent-up demand and
that a percentage of unmarried partners will get married in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision.66 If so, the rise in the marriage rate
would likely be a one- or maybe two-year phenomenon and then level
off. Once the pent-up demand has been fulfilled, the marriage habits of
58 Daphne Lofquist, Same-Sex Couple Households: American Community Survey
Briefs, U.S CENSUS BUREAU, at 3 (Sept. 2011), http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-03.pdf.
59 See Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, supra note 57, at 2.
60 See supra notes 44-54.
61 See Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, supra note 57, at 2.
62 See Martha M. Ertman, Marital Contracting in a Post-Windsor World, 42 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 479, 482 (2015) (“Heterosexual practices are likely to be the most accurate
predictor of changes in marriage and the legal rules governing it.”).
63 See supra Tables 1 & 2. See also Hunter Schwarz, Married Same-Sex Couples
Make Up Less Than One Half of One Percent of All Married Couples in the U.S., WASH.
POST (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/22/married-same-sex-couples-make-up-less-than-one-half-of-one-percent-of-all-marriedcouples-in-the-u-s/ (discussing the census difficulties in reaching an accurate number or
married same-sex couples due to incomplete questionnaires.)
64 See Same Sex Marriage Laws, supra note 36, at 3.
65 As shown in Table 2, there were 901,997 unmarried same-sex partner households
in 2010. If all the partners had gotten married, there would have been 2,997,997 marriages in a population of 308,745,538 instead of the actual number of marriages of
2,096,000. See supra Tables 1 & 2.
66 See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Opinion, Gay Marriage’s Moment, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY
REV. (June 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/opinion/sunday/frank-brunigay-marriages-moment.html.
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same-sex couples might, over time, turn out to be similar to the marriage habits of opposite-sex couples: If so, some will get married, some
will break up, and some will continue to cohabit without getting
married.67
E. Longer-Term Cohabitations
Longer-term cohabiting couples are far from homogeneous.68 No
one-size-fits-all generalization explains why a certain percentage of cohabiting couples continue to cohabit without getting married.69 In some
cases, the couple has reached a joint decision not to marry, but in other
67 See, e.g., Curtis Sittenfeld, Opinion, Welcome, Everyone, to the Right to Marry,
N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY REV. (June 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/28/opinion/
sunday/welcome-everyone-to-the-right-to-marry.html (“Now that same-sex marriage is
legal nationwide, plenty of gay people won’t get married just because they can, just as
plenty of straight people don’t.”).
68 For demographic information on cohabiting couples, see William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation and Divorce: Selectivity or Causal
Influence?, 29 DEMOGRAPHY 357, 358, 364-65, 368, 370-71 (1992); Larry L. Bumpass,
What’s Happening to the Family? Interactions Between Demographic and Institutional
Change, 27 DEMOGRAPHY 483, 486 (1990); Larry L. Bumpass, National Estimates of Cohabitation, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 615, 617-20 (1989); Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of
Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 913-17, 920
(1991); Casey E. Copen et al., First Premarital Cohabitation in the United States: 20062010 National Survey of Family Growth, NAT’L HEALTH STATS. REPS., No. 64 (Apr. 4,
2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr064.pdf; Marcus Dillender, The Death of
Marriage? The Effects of New Forms of Legal Recognition on Marriage Rates in the
United States, 51 DEMOGRAPHY 563, 569-70 (2014); Catherine T. Kenney & Sara S. McLanahan, Why Are Cohabiting Relationships More Violent than Marriages?, 43 DEMOGRAPHY 127,128-29 (2006); Lee A. Lillard et al., Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent
Marital Dissolution: A Matter of Self Selection?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 438-40 (1995);
Martin O’Connell & Sarah Feliz, Same-Sex Couple Household Statistics from the 2010
Census 6, 12 (Soc., Econ., & Housing Div., U.S. Bureau of the Census, Working Paper
No. 2011-26, Sept. 27, 2011); Steffen Reinhold, Reassessing the Link Between Premarital
Cohabitation and Marital Instability, 47 DEMOGRAPHY 719, 719, 723-24 (2010); James A.
Sweet & Larry L. Bumpass, Disruption of Marital and Cohabitation Relationships: A Social-Demographic Perspective, (Nat’l Survey of Families & Households, Working Paper
No. 32, 1990); Arland Thornton, Cohabitation and Marriage in the 1980s, 25 DEMOGRAPHY 497, 498-99, 506 (1988); Jonathon Vespa, Union Formation in Later Life: Economic
Determinants of Cohabitation and Remarriage Among Older Adults, 49 DEMOGRAPHY
1103, 1113, 1120 (2012); Richard Fry & D’Vera Cohn, Living Together: The Economics of
Cohabitation, PEW RES. CTR. (June 27, 2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/
06/pew-social-trends-cohabitation-06-2011.pdf.
69 See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381,
1386-91 (2001); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 185-96 (2015); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 359-64 (2015).
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cases one wants to get married but the other resists.70 In still others,
economic circumstances may dictate or influence the outcome.71 Many
other factors can play a role as well.72 An unfortunate feature of some
cohabiting couples is that they are at or below the poverty level:73 “As
compared with their married counterparts, unmarried parents are lower
income, less educated, disproportionately nonwhite, and more likely to
have children from multiple partners.”74 For many of them, they “have
not selected their situation, they have settled for it.”75
Regardless of the reason for the continuation of the cohabitation,
the couple, as unmarried partners, lack marital status and hence the automatic rights granted to spouses and surviving spouses. As far as the
law is concerned, the partners are complete strangers to one another.
The rapid rise in cohabitation rates is well documented. Table 2
shows the rise from 5.48 million in 2000 to 7.74 million in 2010. Earlier
estimates by the Census Bureau put the number at about 1 million in
1977, 1.7 million in 1980, and 3 million in 1990.76
In a survey conducted in 2010, the Pew Research Center found that
public attitudes widely differ by age groups: “Most adults ages 65 and
older are critical of these unmarried couples, whether they are same-sex
or opposite-sex couples. Most young adults, ages 18 to 29, are not.”77
Although at the current time, only 9.1% of American women age
15 to 44 are cohabiting,78 the percentage is higher at the younger ages.
In the age 20 to 24 category, 15.7% are cohabiting, and in the 25 to 29
year category, the percentage is 12.9.79 As might be expected, the rates
are lower for middle-aged and older people: age 30 to 34, 7.9%, age 35
to 39, 6.7%, and age 40 to 44, 6.6%.80
The most important statistic for spousal-rights law is that for most
people cohabitation is a temporary or short-term state. The parties ei70

See Estin, supra note 69, at 1387, 1394.
See id. at 1387-88.
72 See id. at 1386.
73 See id. at 1388; MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 76 (“Cohabitation is
more common among those of lower educational and income levels.”).
74 Huntington, supra note 69, at 186-87.
75 Ira Mark Ellman, Marital Roles and Declining Marriage Rates, 41 FAM. L.Q. 455,
485 (2007).
76 Lynne M. Casper & Phillip N. Cohen, How Does POSSLQ Measure Up? Historical Estimates of Cohabitation, 37 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 239 tbl.1 (2000).
77 PEW: The Decline of Marriage & Rise of New Families, supra note 9, at 64.
78 Paula Y. Goodwin, William D. Mosher, & Anjani Chandra, Marriage and Cohabitation in the United States: A Statistical Portrait Based on Cycle 6 (2002) of the National
Survey of Family Growth, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 23 VITAL & HEALTH
STATS. 28, at 17, tbl.1 (2010), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_028.pdf.
79 Id.
80 Id.
71
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ther break up or get married fairly quickly. By about one and one-half
years, half the cohabiting couples have either married or broken up.81
Only about ten percent remain cohabiting after five years.82 This does
not mean, however, that at any point in time there are only a few
longer-term cohabitations. The longer-term cohabitations tend to accumulate in the population. More are added every year.
II. CASE LAW: FROM CONTRACT

TO

STATUS83

A. Recovery Based on Contract
The longer-term cohabitations are the ones that tend to find their
way into the legal system. Law suits are brought upon disinheritance at
death or, more commonly, the deliberate decision of one of the parties
to terminate the relationship. The unmarried-cohabitors cases that
come to public attention nearly always involve a defendant who is a
wealthy celebrity, entertainer, or professional athlete. But the less celebrated come to court also. As a Houston divorce attorney once remarked: “You don’t need millions of dollars for people to fight. Give
two people a house worth $200,000 and they’ll consider an action.”84
These suits are sometimes grounded on a common-law marriage
claim, but when that claim is unavailable because the state does not recognize common-law marriages85 or because the arrangement does not
fit within the common-law marriage criteria, the suits can still go forward as ones for “palimony.”86 Not surprisingly, most of the cases arise
in the context of a dissolution during life. Claims arising at death are
less common because, if the partners remain devoted to one another,
the surviving partner might be provided for in the decedent’s will or
other parts of the estate plan.87 Therefore, it is less usual for cases to
81

Id. at 3, 5, 11.
Id. at 35; Casey E. Copen et al., supra note 68, at 5-6; see Matthew D. Bramlett &
William D. Mosher, Cohabitation, Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage in the United
States, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. 23 VITAL & HEALTH STATS. 22, at 67, tbl.29
(2002), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf.
83 Portions of the discussion in Part II draw upon an earlier article: Lawrence W.
Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 61-78 (1994).
84 Gary Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law Claims, NAT’L L.J., Aug.
14, 1989, at 24. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics CPI inflation calculator,
$200,000 in 1989 would be $385,000 in real dollars in 2015.
85 See infra Part II.B.1.
86 The term “palimony” is misleading, because the plaintiff is usually seeking a division of the couple’s property, not an award of periodic payments similar to alimony.
87 In speaking of the power of testation, Jeremy Bentham noted that “a man should
have the means of cultivating the hopes and rewarding the care of . . . a woman who, but
for the omission of a ceremony, would be called his widow . . . .” JEREMY BENTHAM, THE
THEORY OF LEGISLATION 185-86 (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931). But see Joseph W. deFuria Jr.,
Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural
82
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arise in which a surviving partner is making a claim to a share of a decedent’s estate, but such cases do arise.88
Beneficence?, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200, 203 (1989) (“[Although only] a few courts
[raise] a rebuttable presumption of undue influence . . . whenever the testator willed his
estate to a meretricious partner . . . [m]any more courts emphasized that such a relationship raised a significant suspicion of undue influence, which would be closely scrutinized.”); Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. PITT.
L. REV. 225, 266-67 (1981) (“[T]here is at least some evidence to suggest that a homosexual testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in greater risk of
having his testamentary plans overturned than does a heterosexual testator who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to a spouse or lover.”); Jane Birnbaum, Gay Partners’
Problem: Passing on Their Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1994, at 36 (“Propelled in part by
the AIDS epidemic, gay men and lesbians increasingly look to revocable living trusts as a
way to efficiently pass on assets to their partners and to insure their partners will handle
their personal affairs if they become incapacitated. . . . Because the trusts generally avoid
probate and are unpublished, the deceased’s family is less likely to intervene than with a
will.”); Annotation, Existence of Illicit or Unlawful Relation Between Testator and Beneficiary as Evidence of Undue Influence, 76 A.L.R.3d 743, 749 (1977) (describing the ways in
which illicit relationships may give rise to undue influence of a testator).
88 Although most of the cases have involved property disputes between living
cohabitors who have separated, some cases have involved contractual or equitable claims
by the survivor to a share of the other’s estate upon the latter’s death. Complaints
founded upon breach of oral promises supported by social, domestic, nursing, and business services have been held to state a cause of action. See, e.g., Poe v. Estate of Levy,
411 So. 2d 253,254-57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of count
seeking enforcement of an express support contract and count seeking imposition of a
constructive trust in certain property due to a confidential relationship between surviving
cohabitor and decedent, but affirming trial court’s dismissal of count seeking one-half
ownership interest in decedent’s property grounded on argument that their relationship
had the same force and effect as a legal marriage); Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 121,
123-25, 127 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to recover damages for breach of
express oral promise to pay to plaintiff 1,000 shares of stock of the bank of which the
decedent was chairman of the board, in return for which plaintiff made various expenditures and provided loans and services, including “catering services, personal shopping
services, clothing, furniture and furnishings;” decedent, a married man, and plaintiff, an
unmarried woman, did not have a full-time cohabitation relationship, but frequently used
an apartment plaintiff had obtained at decedent’s request); Tyranski v. Piggins, 205
N.W.2d 595, 595-96, 599 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (surviving cohabitor entitled to specific
performance of decedent’s oral promise to convey house to her; plaintiff, a married woman who was separated from her husband, performed various domestic, social, and nursing services for decedent).
Complaints have also been held to state a cause of action when they sought the
imposition of a constructive trust on specific property based on a confidential relationship between the cohabitors. See, e.g., Poe, 411 So. 2d at 256. Complaints seeking damages in the amount of the value of such services on the theory of quantum meruit (as
much as the plaintiff deserved) have also been upheld. See, e.g., Green v. Richmond, 337
N.E.2d 691, 694 (Mass. 1975) (surviving cohabitor entitled to quantum meruit recovery of
damages for value of social, domestic, and business services performed in reliance on
decedent’s oral promise to leave a will devising his entire estate to her); Humiston v.
Bushnell, 394 A.2d 844, 846 (N.H. 1978) (lack of proof of alleged oral promise to devise a
certain parcel of realty prevented surviving cohabitor from recovering damages for
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Plaintiffs seem to have no problem in stating a cause of action when
they allege that they made a financial contribution toward the purchase
of specific property on the understanding that they would be the owner
or part owner. The fact that the property was not titled in the plaintiff’s
name is not a defense. A cause of action for the imposition of a
purchase-money resulting trust or a constructive trust on the specific
property is well established.89
But what if the plaintiff’s contribution came in the form of domestic
services? The case that has received the most notoriety is Marvin v. Marvin.90 The Marvin case was one of the first cases to confront the problem
of remedy in a domestic-services case.
The Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment provides
for an equitable remedy in the case of uncompensated contributions in
the form of property or services:
§ 28. Unmarried Cohabitants. . . . If two persons have formerly
lived together in a relationship resembling marriage, and if one
of them owns a specific asset to which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions in the form of property
or services, the person making such contributions has a claim
in restitution against the owner as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment upon the dissolution of the relationship.91
Nevertheless, with respect to domestic services, the Restatement states
that “[c]laims to restitution based purely on domestic services are less
likely to succeed, because services of this character tend to be classified
breach; surviving cohabitor was entitled to recover in quantum meruit for value of “intimate, confidential, and dedicated personal and business service” she performed for the
decedent with the expectation of being ultimately compensated therefor); In re Estate of
Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 699-700, 709 (Wis. 1980) (surviving cohabitor entitled to recover
damages for value of housekeeping, farming, and nursing services rendered at decedent’s
request and with the expectation of being compensated therefor).
Also, complaints seeking the imposition of an implied partnership with respect to a
business arrangement have been upheld. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thornton, 499 P.2d 864,
867-68 (Wash. 1972) (surviving cohabitor entitled to recover on basis of an implied partnership in cattle-raising business). But the dismissal of a complaint seeking a half interest
in the decedent’s property based on the theory that the parties’ relationship had the same
force and effect as a legal marriage was affirmed. See, e.g., Poe, 411 So. 2d at 256.
89 See, e.g., In re Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Minn. 1983) (surviving
cohabitor entitled to constructive trust in her favor of a one-half interest in home purchased with joint funds but titled in decedent’s name alone).
90 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
91 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 28 (AM. LAW
INST. 2011). Section 28 also provides that the rule of this section “may be displaced,
modified, or supplemented by local domestic relations law.”
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among the reciprocal contributions normally exchanged between cohabitants whether married or not.”92
In consequence, unmarried cohabitors who contribute domestic
services are entering into a much riskier venture than partners entering
into marriages with similar divisions of labor. Those entering into marriages with similar divisions of labor have the divorce laws and the intestacy and elective-share or community-property laws as back-up
protection. Those entering such a relationship without marriage have
virtually no legal rights to fall back on.
What can they do to protect themselves? One thing they can do is
to insist on protection by contract. The reality is, however, that in many
of the litigated cases, there is a disparity of bargaining power. By being
older and already wealthy, one party is often in a dominant position.
For this reason, and because bargaining is done in the shadow of one’s
legal rights and the unmarried have virtually no back-up legal rights, the
other party is in a “subordinate” position.93 If there is to be a contract, a
written contract, as required in two states, Minnesota and Texas,94 the
partner insisting on it is likely to be the dominant one, not the
subordinate one.95 The contract is more likely to take the form of what
one lawyer calls a “Non-Marvinizing” agreement, under which the
subordinate party purports to waive all rights.96 The subordinate party is
92

Id. at cmt. d.
Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979):
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and custodial prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal
rules governing alimony, child support, marital property, and custody give each
parent certain claims based on what each would get if the case went to trial. In
other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached
gives each parent certain bargaining chips—an endowment of sorts.
94 See MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-.076 (2015) (interpreted in Hollom v. Carey, 343
N.W.2d 701, 703-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(3)
(West 2015) (interpreted in Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Tex. App.
1997)).
95 The American Law Institute’s PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.04 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES] also require a written contract, but PRINCIPLES, unlike the law generally, provides that domestic
partners as defined in § 6.03 have marital-type rights upon dissolution of the relationship.
See id. §§ 6.04-.06.
Premarital and marital agreements must be in writing. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.4 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); UNIF.
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 9 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R
2012). The requirement is justified because married partners, unlike unmarried partners,
have rights upon dissolution of the marriage.
96 The lawyer, as reported in Jane Bryant Quinn’s 1991 book, Making the Most of
Your Money (at page 84), is William P. Cantwell, who served as the Reporter for the
93
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likely just as hesitant to raise or press the subject of a contract as marriage. Subordinate parties who do press the issue, gently or not, are
more likely to get vague oral statements than a written contract for their
effort.
Consequently, the plaintiff in many litigated cases alleges an oral
contract, which in the end may not be provable. The Marvin case fell
into this category. The plaintiff, Michelle Triola Marvin,97 brought a
breach of contract action against the defendant, Lee Marvin. Because
the trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for the defendant,98
the question on appeal was whether the plaintiff’s complaint stated a
cause of action.99 The California Supreme Court held that it did,100 but
on remand Michelle could not prove her allegation.101
The facts alleged in Michelle’s complaint were that in October of
1964, she and Lee “entered into an oral agreement.”102 As is typical of
these complaints, Michelle not only listed the domestic services she
agreed to perform but also the opportunities for employment or training
she agreed to forgo. The services she listed were “companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook.”103 Michelle’s forgone opportunities
were “her lucrative career as an entertainer [and] singer.”104 Lee, in
turn, she alleged, not only agreed “to share equally any and all property
Uniform Marital Property Act (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R 1983). His “Non-Marvinizing”
Agreement, which would be suitable for parties of equal bargaining power, states,
We have decided to live together beginning on __. We do not intend that any
common law marriage should arise from this. We have not made any promises
to each other about economic matters. We do not intend any economic rights to
arise from our relationship. If in the future we decide that any promises of an
economic nature should exist between us, we will put them in writing, and only
such written promises made by us in a written memorandum signed by us in the
future shall have any force between us. Signed at __ on __.
Whether the law should treat a document such as this as effective is questionable without
the safeguards of premarital agreements. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 95, § 6.01(2) &
cmt. b. At a minimum, the law should require evidence of informed consent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 9.4 cmt. f;
UNIF. PREMARITAL & MARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012).
97 Michelle Triola officially changed her surname to Marvin, even though she and
Lee Marvin never married. Elaine Woo, Michelle Triola Marvin dies at 75; Her Legal
Fight with Ex-Lover Lee Marvin Added ‘Palimony’ to the Language, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2009), http://www.latimes.com/local/obituaries/la-me-michelle-triola-marvin31-2009oct31story.html.
98 Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 556-57 (Ct. App. 1981).
99 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).
100 Id. at 123.
101 Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57, 559.
102 Herma Hill Kay & Carol Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65
CAL. L. REV. 937, 955 (1977).
103 Id. at 955 (quoting Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10).
104 Id. (quoting Appellant’s Reply Brief at 10).
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accumulated” during the cohabitation105 but also “to provide for all of
[her] financial support and needs for the rest of her life.”106
Michelle and Lee lived together for about five and a half years
(from October 1964 through May 1970).107 During this period, she alleged, the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings acquired in
Lee’s name substantial real and personal property, including motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 1970, however, Lee (in the
language of the complaint) “compelled” her to leave his household. He
continued to support her for another year and a half (until November
1971), but thereafter refused to provide further support.
In a landmark decision, the California Supreme Court held that her
complaint stated a cause of action. The Marvin decision addressed two
questions. First, is an express contract enforceable, assuming that it can
be proved if oral? Second, if no express contract can be proved, does the
disappointed cohabiting partner have any rights at all?
The principal obstacle to recovering for breach of an express oral
contract, other than the necessity of proving the contract, was what the
courts call the “meretricious” nature of such a relationship—that the
relationship involved sexual activity. Because prostitution is illegal,108 a
contract for prostitution is unenforceable.109 A few post-Marvin decisions in other states—Georgia and Illinois—have held that contracts between unmarried cohabitors are unenforceable for that reason alone,
citing public policy grounds.110 Those decisions are still presumptively
good law in those states.
105 Michelle’s actual allegation was that the parties agreed that “they would ‘combine
their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property accumulated as a
result of their efforts whether individual or combined.’” Id. But, since it appears that the
parties contemplated that Michelle would remove herself from the work force, it appears
that it was Lee’s earnings that were to be shared. Id.
106 Id.
107 According to her Wikipedia entry, Michelle Triola began living in Malibu with the
actor Dick Van Dyke in 1976. She lived with Van Dyke until her death in 2009 at age 76.
They never married. Van Dyke is still living, but Lee Marvin died at age 63 in 1987. See
Michelle Triola Marvin, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michelle_Triola_Mar
vin (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
108 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 653.20-.28 (West 2015). For a link to prostitution
laws in all states, see State Prostitution Laws, FINDLAW.COM, http://statelaws.findlaw.com/
criminal-laws/prostitution.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
109 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1596, 1598 (West 2015).
110 See, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 1977) (“It is well settled that
neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to a contract
founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration. Code Ann. § 20-501. . . . The parties
being unmarried and the appellant having admitted the fact of cohabitation in both verified pleadings, this would constitute immoral consideration under Code Ann. § 20-501 . . .
”.); See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1208-09 (Ill. 1979) (“Illinois’ public policy
regarding agreements such as the one alleged here was implemented long ago . . . where
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The Marvin court sought to remove the meretricious-consideration
obstacle to enforcement. The court held that the sexual component of
the arrangement could prevent enforcement only if the contract was
“expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of sexual
services.”111 This was not the case in Marvin, for Michelle did not allege
that one of the services for which Lee agreed to pay was for her to be his
lover.
The time has surely come to put the meretricious-consideration argument behind us. It is surely time to remove it as an obstacle to enforcement of these agreements, as the Supreme Court of Connecticut
held in Boland v. Catalano,112 for there is no way these cases involve
agreements for prostitution. Perhaps the Marvin court thought it had
done that by making contracts enforceable unless the contract was “expressly and inseparably” based upon “sexual services.”113 In adopting
this as a determining principle, the court may have been groping for a
way to fit domestic partnerships into a spectrum between contracts for
prostitution on the one end and marriages on the other. Marriages, like
cohabiting partnerships, undeniably involve both a financial and a sexual component. But so do contracts for prostitution. Perhaps the Marvin court thought that the distinction between marriage and prostitution
was that the sexual and financial components are express and inseparable in the case of prostitution, whereas in marriage, the two components
are not expressly dependent upon each other. The existence of these
two components in a marriage is merely inherent in the nature of the
marital relationship. Perhaps the Marvin court concluded that a good
way to liken cohabiting partnerships to marriages and not to contracts
for prostitution was to emphasize the express and inseparable interdependence of the financial and sexual components in a contract for
prostitution.
A truer distinction between marriage and the typical contract for
prostitution is the existence in marriage of the linking together of two
whole lives, emotionally, financially, and physically, through sharing the
same household in an arrangement involving love, romance, commitment, caring, and so on. This third component is missing from a typical
this court said: ‘An agreement in consideration of future illicit cohabitation between the
plaintiffs is void.’. . . The issue, realistically, is whether it is appropriate for this court to
grant a legal status to a private arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage
sanctioned by the State. The question whether change is needed in the law . . . [is best
left to] the legislative branch . . . “).
111 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 114 (Cal. 1976).
112 Boland v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987) (“We conclude that our public policy does not prevent the enforcement of agreements regarding property rights between unmarried cohabitants in a sexual relationship.”)
113 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 114.
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contract for prostitution, but it is not missing from a cohabiting partnership. The Marvin court would have been on sounder ground if it had
distinguished contracts for prostitution from cohabiting partnerships on
this basis rather than on the “express and inseparable”114 basis. This
approach would have completely removed the obstacle of meretricious
consideration from enforcement of the financial component of cohabiting-partnership contracts.
Perhaps the Marvin court thought that the “express and inseparable” distinction itself eliminated the meretricious consideration obstacle
for all cohabiting partnership cases. If so, it did not turn out that way. It
was easy in Marvin to sever the sexual component of the parties’ relationship, because Michelle’s complaint never alleged that one of her
“services” was to be Lee’s lover. Nevertheless, in a subsequent California case, Jones v. Daly,115 the plaintiff made the mistake of alleging in
his complaint that one of the services he agreed to perform, in addition
to domestic services, was to be the defendant’s “lover.” This proved to
be fatal, for the court held that the complaint did not state a cause of
action, citing the ground that the plaintiff’s “allegations clearly show
that plaintiff’s rendition of sexual services to Daly was an inseparable
part of the consideration for the ‘cohabitors agreement,’ and indeed was
the predominant consideration.”116“There is,” the court said, “no severable portion of the ‘cohabitors agreement’ supported by independent
consideration.”117
The solution came in a still later case, Whorton v. Dillingham.118
The complaint in that case listed mutual sexual promises—that the
plaintiff promised to be the defendant’s “lover” and that the defendant
promised to be the plaintiff’s “lover.” The court held the complaint
stated a cause of action. In a key passage, the court stated that “by
itemizing the mutual promises to engage in sexual activity, [the plaintiff]
has not precluded the trier of fact from finding those promises are the
consideration for each other and independent of the bargained for consideration for [the plaintiff’s] employment.”119
The Whorton analysis suggests a responsible way around the problem in a jurisdiction forced to work within the “express and inseparable”
distinction. Even if sexual intimacy is listed in the complaint on only
one side, surely the way to handle these cases is to presume that the
sexual component of a cohabitation is always separable from the other
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130, 131 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Whorton v. Dillingham 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 409-10.
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parts of the contract, on the ground—to be blunt—that the consideration for sex is sex. I do not want to be understood as saying that the
idea that the consideration for sex is sex is a realistic way of analyzing
the complicated emotional, financial, and physical relationships that exist in a cohabiting partnership, any more than I would suggest that this
idea is a realistic way of analyzing those relationships in a marriage. My
point is merely that, in a jurisdiction forced to work under the “express
and inseparable” principle, this is a convenient, though fictitious, way of
dealing with the problem.
B. Recovery Based on Status
1.

Common-Law Marriage

Most states have abolished common-law marriage by statute.120
Only ten states and the District of Columbia still recognize the concept.
The ten states are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana,
Oklahoma,121 Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.122 New
Hampshire recognizes common-law marriage, but only for purposes of
intestacy.123 After Obergefell,124 common-law marriages in these states
would be open to same sex couples.
The general elements of common-law marriage are capacity to
enter into a marriage (for example, not being married to someone else),
a present agreement to be married (not an agreement to get married in
the future), cohabitation (but no period of cohabitation is necessary),
and holding out as married to the community.125 Negative judicial and
legislative reaction to the concept of common-law marriage grew during
the late nineteenth century. One criticism of the concept was that the
120 See, e.g., Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.2 (West 2015); See also Common Law
Marriage Fact Sheet, UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.unmarried.org/common-lawmarriage-fact-sheet/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016); Common Law Marriage by State, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEG. (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
121 There is some uncertainty in Oklahoma. See Common Law Marriage Fact Sheet,
supra note 120.
122 Common-law marriages are recognized in the following states only if created
before a certain date: Georgia (if created before Jan. 1, 1997, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1
(2015)), Idaho (if created before Jan. 1, 1996, IDAHO CODE § 32-201 (2015)), Ohio (if
created before Oct. 10, 1991, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.12(B)(2) (LexisNexis 2015)),
and Pennsylvania (if created before Jan. 1, 2005, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2015)).
123 “Persons cohabiting and acknowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them,
shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally married.” N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39
(2015).
124 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
125 See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage, 75 OR. L. REV. 709, 712-14 (1996).
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informality of common-law marriages makes them highly vulnerable to
fraud and perjury.126 More prominent was the argument that recognition of common-law marriage undermines formal marriage.127 One
commentator who has studied common-law marriage has concluded that
the fear of fraud does not stand up to scrutiny and that other objections
are outweighed by more important values, such as the protection of women, especially poor women.128
There is no proof that recognition of common-law marriage undermines formal marriage: Despite the legal and other advantages of formal marriage,129 formal marriage is already on the decline and
unmarried cohabitation is on the rise irrespective of whether a state recognizes or has abolished common-law marriage. The 2010 Census Bureau Report on Households and Families130 lists—for the whole country
and jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction—the percentage of unmarried oppositesex partner households and husband-and-wife households. The following table shows the results for the country and for the jurisdictions that
recognize common-law marriage. Because each household self-reports
its own identity, the husband-and-wife listings do not distinguish between formal-marriage households and common-law marriage households. If they did, we would know for sure whether there are below
average formal marriages in common-law marriage jurisdictions and
enough common-law marriages to bring the total roughly up to par.
Nevertheless, we can get some clue by comparing husband-and-wife
households with unmarried opposite-sex partner households, on the theory that in common-law marriage jurisdictions, some couples who had
not formally married would identify their relationship as husband and
wife rather than unmarried. If so, the results should show a consistent
pattern in which the percentage of self-reported husband-and-wife
households is above average and the percentage of unmarried oppositesex partner households is below average. The results show no such consistent pattern. Five of the eleven common-law marriage jurisdictions—
Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, and Utah—fit that pattern but the
other six—Alabama, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Montana, Rhode
Island, and South Dakota—do not. Of the five, Utah is the only jurisdiction that shows a dramatic difference in result. But the comparative
results for one idiosyncratic jurisdiction fall far short of proving that
126 See, e.g., Staudenmeyer v. Staudenmeyer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Pa. 1998) (citing
In re Wagner, 159 A.2d 495, 497 (Pa. 1960)).
127 See, e.g., Sorenson v. Sorenson, 100 N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1904). See generally
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 73, 75, 87-88 (G. Edward White ed. 1985).
128 See Bowman, supra note 125, at 779-80.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.
130 Daphne Lofquist et al., supra note 14 at 5, 18.
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common-law marriage discourages formal marriage. While recognition
of common-law marriage may play a part in Utah, other cultural differences probably play a part as well.131 Overall, there is no consistent pattern showing that recognition of common-law marriage undermines
formal marriage. Quite the opposite: The results are inconsistent with
that proposition.
TABLE 3
Unmarried Opposite-Sex Partner and Husband-Wife
Households: 2010
Opposite Sex Unmarried
Partner Households as
Percentage of All
Households in that
Jurisdiction132

Self-identified HusbandWife Households as a
Percentage of All
Households in that
Jurisdiction133

United States

5.9

48.4

Alabama

4.1

47.9

Colorado

5.6

49.2

United States and
Individual Jurisdictions
Recognizing Common-law
Marriage

District of Columbia

5.8

22.0

Iowa

6.2

51.2

Kansas

5.3

51.1

Montana

6.1

49.2

Oklahoma

5.3

49.5

Rhode Island

6.7

44.5

South Dakota

6.1

50.1

Texas

5.2

50.6

Utah

3.9

61.0

In some states where common-law marriage has been abolished,
courts have applied a de facto common-law marriage doctrine to
couples who lived together in a common-law marriage state. In Kellard
v. Kellard,134 a New York man and woman, unmarried but cohabiting
with one another, took an automobile trip to Disney World in 1978.
During the trip, they stayed overnight in a motel in South Carolina
where they registered as husband and wife, and engaged in sexual inter131 Professor Bowman, supra note 125, at 749-50, explains that the Utah statute recognizing common-law marriage, which was enacted in 1987, may have been based on the
false premise that it was necessary to prevent couples from excluding one person’s income when applying for Aid to Families with Dependent Children.
132 Daphne Lofquist et al., supra note 14, at 16 tbl.6.
133 Id. at 10 tbl.4.
134 13 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987).
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course. They also stayed for two nights in a motel in Georgia. Some
years later, in defense to a divorce suit filed in New York by the woman,
the man claimed that no divorce was necessary because he was not married to the plaintiff. A New York court rejected his defense, holding
that the couple’s behavior en route to Disney World satisfied the common-law marriage requirements of South Carolina and Georgia. This,
along with the lengthy history of the couple’s relationship, led the court
to recognize them as married.135
2. In States That Have Abolished Common-Law Marriage
What if an unmarried cohabitor enters upon a cohabitation arrangement without contractual protection in a state that has abolished
common-law marriage? In Marvin, Michelle Triola alleged an oral contract, but a plaintiff who alleges an oral contract has the burden of proof
and she was unable to carry that burden. The courts in a few jurisdictions have closed the door to plaintiffs without an express contract136
and at least two state legislatures, Minnesota and Texas, have closed the
door to plaintiffs without an express written contract.137 The advantage
of such a bright-line test, especially the one that insists on an express
written contract, is that it introduces an element of efficiency into the
law in the manner of the Statute of Frauds and similar to the efficiency
accruing from grounding spousal rights on status. The cohabiting partner with a contract can claim the contractual rights without having to
prove anything about the underlying details or commitment of the relationship. Just as the marriage certificate qualifies the spouse for what
135

See also Taylor, supra note 84, at 24.
See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602, 604 (Alaska 1980); Boland v. Catalano,
521 A.2d 142, 146 (Conn. 1987); Aehegma v. Aehegma, 797 P.2d 74, 79 (Haw. Ct. App.
1990); In re Estate of Alexander, 445 So. 2d 836, 840 (Miss. 1984) (holding that if a
remedy is to be given to a surviving cohabitant in the absence of an express contract, “the
Legislature should provide the remedy.”); Dominguez v. Cruz, 617 P.2d 1322, 1323 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1980); Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157-58 (N.Y. 1980). See also
Carnes v. Sheldon, 311 N.W.2d 747, 753 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (although prior Michigan
cases have held that express contracts are enforceable to the extent they are based on
independent consideration, and have enforced contracts implied in fact for wages or for
the value of commercial services, the court in the instant case was “unwilling to extend
equitable principles to the extent plaintiff would have us do, since recovery based on
principles of contracts implied in law essentially would resurrect the old common-law
marriage doctrine which was specifically abolished by the Legislature. . . . [J]udicial restraint requires that the Legislature, rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate forum
for addressing the question raised by plaintiff. We believe a contrary ruling would contravene the public policy of this state ‘disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to knowingly unmarried cohabitants.”).
137 MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075-.076 (2015) (interpreted in Hollom v. Carey, 343 N.W.2d
701, 703-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(3) (West
2015) (interpreted in Zaremba v. Cliburn, 949 S.W.2d 822, 826-27 (Tex. App. 1997)).
136
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the law allows, the written contract qualifies the cohabiting partnerplaintiff for what the contract allows.
The disadvantage is that plaintiffs with just claims are shut out.
This category includes plaintiffs who are in a “subordinate” position to
the defendant in terms of bargaining power, and hence are unable to
obtain contractual protection.138 More importantly, perhaps, this category also includes a disproportionate number of plaintiffs who are unsophisticated in the ways of the law.
To its credit, the court in the Marvin case thought that there would
be cases that warranted relief even without a contract, and there are
cases in which the plaintiff’s claim seems undeniably just. In seeking to
find a way of analyzing this problem, the court in Marvin used an interesting phrase. The court spoke, and spoke repeatedly, of enforcing the
“reasonable expectations of the parties.”139 “The courts may inquire
into the conduct of the parties140 to determine whether that conduct
demonstrates an implied contract or implied agreement of partnership
or joint venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties,”
the court said.141
In speaking of the “reasonable expectations of the parties”—plural—the court was probably knowingly engaging in a fiction. Few could
doubt that the parties in the Marvin case did not enter or continue the
arrangement with the same expectations. Some interesting empirical research has shown that different expectations are standard. The study
found,
While most cohabitors expect to marry their partner, there is a
substantial proportion who disagree about marriage, and a
high proportion are concerned about the stability of their relationship. Thus the picture that is emerging is that cohabitation
is very much a family status, but one in which levels of certainty about the relationship are lower than in marriage. .142
138

See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 116, 122 (Cal. 1976).
140 See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law: State, Law, and
Family in the United States and Western Europe 279 (1989). According to Professor
Glendon, the reference to an inquiry into the conduct of the parties raised “the prospect
of litigation in which the private lives of the parties can be explored in detail [and] has led
already to the settlement out of court of a number of suits by alleged same-sex lovers or
clandestine playmates of well-known people.”
141 Marvin, 557 P.2d at 122.
142 See Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation, supra note 68, at 913; see also Ronald R. Rindfuss & Audrey VandeHeuvel, Cohabitation: Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single, 16 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 703, 721 (1990) (empirical study
finding that “cohabitors are substantially more similar [in their attitudes toward matters
such as marriage and childbearing plans] to the singles than to the married”).
139
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To be sure, this study reports on marriage expectations in shorter-term
cohabitations, and the Marvin court’s emphasis was on a different type
of expectation—the expectation that there will be “profit-sharing.” To
be sure, also, the emphasis here is on the longer-term cohabitations,
those that are the exception overall but tend to accumulate in the population. In any event, Lee Marvin and Michelle Triola, it would probably
be safe to speculate, did not share the same expectations, not even when
entering into or during the happy periods of their arrangement.
Michelle probably hoped and maybe even expected that Lee would
eventually marry her or, failing that, that he would “do right” by her
financially. Whether Lee ever intended to do either is unclear. He certainly determined never to give her a dime shortly after they broke up.
So, what do we make of the court’s emphasis on “the reasonable
expectations of the parties”? The court could be saying one of two
things. One is that there should be an inquiry into whether the defendant’s behavior reasonably led the plaintiff to think that he had the
same expectations she did, i.e., whether the defendant led her on. The
other, more significant possibility is that the court is saying that it will
attribute or impute “reasonable” expectations even when they are fictional regarding one of them.
Although this latter idea came to nothing in the Marvin case itself,143 some courts, in later cases, have applied this idea. Case authority
has held that committed cohabitation relationships have the same force
and effect as a legal marriage.144 Many if not all of these cases involve
relationships that would be common-law marriages but for the abolition
of that doctrine. Two examples will suffice.145 The first is Goode v.
143 Marvin v. Marvin, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555, 559 (Ct. App. 1976) (On remand, Michelle
failed to prove the existence of an express or implied contract, but the trial court awarded
her $104,000 for rehabilitation on the ground of an unspecified equitable theory. On
appeal, the judgment granting this award was reversed for want of a “recognized underlying obligation in law or in equity.”); See also Taylor v. Polackwich, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8, 13
(Ct. App. 1983) (“rehabilitative award” reversed on appeal).
144 For examples of cases providing for equitable division of property acquired while
the couple cohabited before marrying or acquired while the couple cohabited after having divorced each other, see Eaton v. Johnson, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1094, 1094 (Kan.
Ct. App. 1983); Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875-76 (Miss. 1986); Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834-37 (Wash. 1995) (applying the principle of In re Marriage of
Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328, 331 (Wash. 1984)).
145 Other post-Marvin cases have asserted claims based on nonfamily doctrines, such
as express contract, contract implied in fact, contract implied in law, quantum meruit, and
constructive trust. See, e.g., Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311, 314-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995);
W. States Constr., Inc. v. Michoff, 840 P.2d 1220, 1222, 1224 (Nev. 1992); Watts v. Watts,
405 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Wis. 1987). Decisions in many of these cases are ambiguous as to
whether the court based recovery on a contract implied in fact or on unjust enrichment
grounds.
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Goode,146 a West Virginia case. Carl and Martha Goode separated after
having lived together for twenty-eight years. Although the couple had
never formally married, they had consistently held themselves out to the
public as husband and wife. They had four children. Martha, age 47,
filed a divorce action against Carl, age 61, seeking an equitable division
of the property they had acquired during their 28-year period of cohabitation. Although West Virginia is not a common-law marriage state, the
court held that Martha could recover, saying:
[W]e hold that a court may order a division of property acquired by a man and woman who are unmarried cohabitants,
but who have considered themselves and held themselves out
to be husband and wife. Such order may be based upon principles of contract, either express or implied, or upon a constructive trust. Factors to be considered in ordering such a division
of property may include: the purpose, duration, and stability of
the relationship and the expectations of the parties. Provided,
however, that if either the man or woman is validly married to
another person during the period of cohabitation, the property
rights of the spouse and support rights of the children of such
man or woman shall not in any way be adversely affected by
such division of property.147 The expectations of the parties
under these circumstances would be equitable treatment by the
other party in exchange for engaging in such a cohabiting
relationship.
My second example is a case that goes even farther and allows an
unmarried plaintiff to utilize the divorce laws directly. That case is Warden v. Warden.148 Charles Warden and Denise Boursier began living together in 1963, holding themselves out as husband and wife. They had
two children. In 1972, Charles moved to California and formally married another woman. After learning of this, Denise brought suit under
the divorce laws for child support and an equitable division of property,
which the trial court awarded. Charles appealed that part of the judg146

396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990).
Id. at 438. Under the facts of this case, the parties lived together for an extended
period of time, considered themselves as husband and wife, and, in fact, pooled their
resources to include taking property under three joint deeds. Therefore, in this case, the
equities are more easily determined than in a relationship between two parties which was
for a shorter duration, or where the parties did not consider themselves to be husband
and wife, or where the parties did not pool their resources. Id. at 431-32. Cases in other
jurisdictions have noted that, “[e]ach case should be assessed on its own merits with consideration given to the purpose, duration and stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties.” Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672, 674 (Nev. 1984).
148 676 P.2d 1037, 1038-40 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984); See also W. States Constr., Inc. 840
P.2d at 1223-24.
147
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ment decreeing a division of the property. Although Washington is not
a common-law marriage state, the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, saying,
We believe the time has come for the provision of [the Washington statute providing for equitable division of property
upon dissolution of a marriage] to govern the disposition of the
property acquired by a man and a woman who have lived together and established a relationship, which is tantamount to a
marital family except for a legal marriage.
The trial judge here properly treated Denise and Charles as a
marital family and correctly considered the length and purpose
of their relationship, the two children, the contributions of the
parties, and the future prospects of each. He correctly assumed that both Denise and Charles contributed to the acquisition of the property and divided it in a manner which was
“just and equitable after considering all relevant factors.”149
Once the case law grants extra-contractual rights to disappointed cohabiting partners, the law is granting rights based on “status.” Unlike marital status, though, each litigated cohabitation must be probed in order to
classify the relationship as a marriage in fact or not as a marriage in fact
to determine whether relief is warranted. Each plaintiff must prove that
the underlying nature of his or her relationship with the defendant warrants recovery. The extract quoted from the Warden opinion gives some
idea of what must be proved. Another definition comes from the New
York case of Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,150 a case that involved an
analogous question under the New York rent control laws: There must
be, the court said,
an objective examination of the relationship of the parties [,
including] the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the
level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in
which the parties have conducted their everyday lives and held
themselves out to society, and the reliance placed upon one
another for daily family services. . . . These factors are most
helpful, although it should be emphasized that the presence or
absence of one or more of them is not dispositive since it is the
totality of the relationship as evidenced by the dedication, car-

149 Warden, 676 P.2d at 1039-40. Contra Crowe v. De Gioia, 495 A.2d 889, 897-98
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985), aff’d, 505 A.2d 591, 591 (N.J. 1986) (rejecting plaintiff’s
claim for equitable distribution of defendant’s property).
150 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
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ing and self-sacrifice of the parties which should, in the final
analysis, control.151
III. A UNIFORM DE FACTO MARRIAGE ACT?
Part I draws attention othe cultural shift in the formation of families that has been and is taking place in this country. In fact, the same
cultural shift is taking place throughout the developed world.152 To be
sure, now that same-sex marriage is legal in all American jurisdictions,
many same-sex couples who were previously cohabiting will enter into a
formal marriage. But some will continue to cohabit without marrying,
just as many opposite-sex couples continue to cohabit without marrying.
The time may now be ripe to start thinking about the rights, if any, of
unmarried cohabitors. I addressed this matter long ago, in my Joseph
Trachtman Lecture at the 1992 annual meeting of the American College
of Trust and Estate Counsel.153 Other scholars have more recently
raised the matter.154
The questions the case law described in Part II leaves us with are
these: Can—and should—we replace the case-by-case, hit-or-miss adjudication with legislation—a De Facto Marriage Act—that adopts criteria for determining which cohabiting couples have martial rights and
which do not? Other English-speaking jurisdictions have already enacted or introduced legislation granting marital rights to cohabiting
couples if their relationship meets specific criteria. Legislation recogniz151 Id. at 55; See also Mary Patricia Truethart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition
of “Family,” 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, 99 (1991).
152 See Anna Stêpieñ-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, Cohabitation: Social Changes and
the Protection of the Vulnerable Party, at 1 (Indiana Univ. Robert H. McKinney School of
Law Research Paper No. 2015-48), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2693467 (“The increasing
number of unmarried couples living together is a worldwide trend, made possible by
changes in social attitudes toward cohabitation.”).
153 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 18 THE PROB.
LAW. 1, 47-66 (1992).
154 See Huntington, supra note 69, at 223; Scott & Scott, supra note 69, at 313-14, 363
(arguing that “The fact that the law confers deference and societal resources on marriage
does not mean that the privileged status of this traditional family form should be exclusive” and noting that “legal benefits are sometimes extended to adult de facto relationships on the basis of their similarity to marriage,” and that “[s]ome cohabiting couples are
clearly in family relationships, and regulators may be able to employ a few straightforward proxies to minimize verifiability problems.”); Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality
and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185 (2016); Anna Stêpieñ-Sporek & Margaret Ryznar, The Consequences of Non-Marriages, 49 U.S.F. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(canvassing legal treatment of cohabiting couples in Europe); Deborah A. Widiss, NonMarital Families and (or After?) Marriage Equality, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 547, 557, 559,
562, 564 (2015).
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ing marital rights has been enacted in Australia,155 Canada,156 and New
Zealand157 and has been introduced in the United Kingdom.158
In this country, the American Law Institute (ALI) has recognized
that longer-term cohabitants have rights similar to married couples upon
dissolution of the relationship.159 Because the ALI put forward its project as what it calls “Principles of the Law,” which the ALI says are
155 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA (Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act 1984
(NSW) § 4 (Austl.); De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) pt 1 § 3A, pt 2 div 2 § 10, pt 2
div 5 §§ 24, 28, pt 4 § 52 (Austl.); Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act
2003 (Qld) (Austl.); Succession Act 1981 (Qld) pt 1 § 5AA (Austl.); Acts Interpretation
Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA (Austl.).
156 Family Law Act, R.S.A. 2003, c F-4.5 §§ 56-63 (Can.); Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, R.S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1) (Can.); Family Law Act, R.S.B.C. 2011, c 25
§ 3(1) (Can.); Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 128, § 1(1) (Can.); Nunavut Act,
R.S.C. 1993, c 28, § 29 (Can.) (providing that the law of the Northwest Territories applies
in Nunavut); Family Maintenance Act, R.S.M. 2015, c F-20 § 1 (Can.); Common Law
Partners’ Property & Related Amendments Act, R.S.M. 2002, c 48 (Can.); Family Services Act, R.S.N.B. 1980, c F-2.2, § 1 (Can.); Family Law Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1990, c 18,
§ 1(1) (Can.); Maintenance & Custody Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c 160, § 2(aa) (Can.); Family
Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.3, § 29 (Can.); Family Law Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F-2.1,
§ 29(1)(b) (Can.); Family Property Act, R.S.S. 1997, c F-6.3, § 2 (Can.); Family Maintenance Act, R.S.S. 1990-91, c F-6.2, § 2 (Can.).
Unlike nearly all of the other provinces and territories, the Province of Quebec does
not recognize marital rights for unmarried partners. In Attorney General of Quebec v. A.,
[2013] 1 S.C.R. 61 (Can.), a sharply divided Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the province’s denial of such rights under the equality provision of the Canadian Constitution. (Canadian Charter of Rights & Freedoms, § 15(1), Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.)). I thank
Professor Emeritus Ejan Mackaay of the University of Montreal for bringing this case to
my attention.
157 Property (Relationships) Act 1976, §§ 2A-2E (N.Z.). For a report on the New
Zealand Act in operation, see Bill Atkin, The Legal World of Unmarried Couples: Reflections on “De Facto Relationships in Recent New Zealand Legislation (6 Victoria Univ. of
Wellington Legal Res. Paper No. 11/ 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2535129, updating 39
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 793, 793 (2008) (While there will inevitably be borderline situations, most are likely to fall easily within or outside the definition.). Earlier
articles on the New Zealand legislation include Bill Atkin, The Challenge of Unmarried
Cohabitation—The New Zealand Response, 37 FAM. L.Q. 303 (2003); Bill Atkin, Matrimonial and De Facto Property Law Reform, 3 BUTTERWORTHS FAM. L.J. 221 (2001); Bill
Atkin, De Factos Down-Under and Their Property, 11 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 43 (1999).
158 Cohabitation Rights Bill, 2015-16, HL Bill [29] cl. 1, 2 (UK), http://services.parlia
ment.uk/bills/2015-16/cohabitationrights.html (1st reading June 4, 2015); LAW COMM’N,
INTESTACY & FAMILY PROVISIONS CLAIMS ON DEATH, No. 331, at 152 (2011) (UK),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/247168/
1674.pdf.
159 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.01-6.06, app. II, § 5.09 (AM. LAW INST. 2000) [hereinafter ALI UNMARRIED
PARTNER STATUTE].
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“primarily addressed to legislatures,”160 I refer to that project as the
“ALI Unmarried Partner Statute.” The ALI, however, is known for its
Restatements of the Law, which are directed to courts, not legislatures.161 Although the ALI Unmarried Partner Statute has not been
transformed into a bill and introduced in any state legislature, the explanation may lie elsewhere than on the merits of the proposal. The ALI is
not organized to take any post-publication action to promote enactment
of its Principles Statutes. Moreover, the sections dealing with unmarried partners is a small part of a much larger project dealing principally
with dissolution of formal marriages—allocation of custodial and decision-making responsibility for children, child support, division of property upon dissolution, compensatory spousal payments, and premarital,
marital, and separation agreements.
The Uniform Law Commission (ULC) is the law-reform organization whose sole purpose is drafting and promoting its legislation. That
makes the ULC the logical organization for studying the problem of
marital rights for cohabiting couples.162 The question for study is
whether a De Facto Marriage Act could and should be enacted here.163
In studying the problem, the ULC will find helpful the Commonwealth,
ALI, and other sources.164
A De Facto Marriage Act would codify the principle that unmarried partners can gain marital rights and would codify the criteria for
qualifying for such rights. In the case of married partners, the marriage
160 See How Do Principles of the Law Differ from Restatements of the Law?, AM.
LAW INST., https://www.ali.org/publications/frequently-asked-questions/#differ (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
161 Full disclosure: I have been a Restatement Reporter: RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS (AM. LAW INST. 1999, 2003, 2011).
162 Full disclosure: I have drafted legislation for the ULC and have been Chief Reporter and Director of Research for the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and
Estate Acts. I served as Reporter for the Uniform Probate Code Article II Revisions
(promulgated 1990, 1993, 2008, and 2009), the Revised Uniform Testamentary Additions
to Trusts Act (promulgated 1991), the Revised Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
(promulgated 1991), and the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities (promulgated
1986).
163 See Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and
Consideration of Uniform and Model Acts, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws
.org/Narrative.aspx?title CR iteria%20for%20New%20Projects (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
164 In addition to the UK and Commonwealth statutes and the ALI Unmarried Partner Statute, there are numerous Law Revision Commission Reports that support the idea
of de facto marriage. See, e.g., LAW COMM’N, COHABITATION: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCE OF RELATIONSHIP BREAKDOWN, No. 179 (2006) (UK), http://www.lawcom
.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/cp179_Cohabitation_Consultation.pdf; INTESTACY &
FAMILY PROVISIONS CLAIMS ON DEATH, supra note 158, 24 ¶ 1.99; QUEENSLAND LAW
REFORM COMM’N, INTESTACY RULES, No. 42, 17 § 2.2.1(1993) (Austl.), http://www
.qlrc.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/372521/r42.pdf.
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license, the wedding ceremony, and the marriage certificate signify intent to acquire the rights of marriage. More accurately, the marriage
laws attribute that intent to married partners, because it is unlikely that
many married partners actually formed that intent with full knowledge
of what those rights are. Cohabiting couples have none of these official
indicia of intent. On what basis, then, should the law ever declare that
cohabiting couples have become married in fact, i.e., have a de facto
marriage? For them, a De Facto Marriage Act would treat committed
behavior occurring over time as signifying (again, by attribution) intent
to acquire the rights of formal marriage. If a relationship that has been
edging toward de facto marriage continues to progress along that continuum, the relationship will likely, at some point, cross the line between
cohabitation and marriage in fact. That would be the tipping point—the
time when a court of competent jurisdiction could justifiably declare the
couple’s relationship as having reached marital status.
How should a De Facto Marriage Act be crafted? On this, the
Commonwealth statutes and other resources have reached a general
consensus. The Act would codify an overriding standard for determining whether a de facto marriage has occurred and then list factors for a
court to take into account in determining whether that standard has
been satisfied.
The starting point is that the couple must not be married to anyone
else165 and must not be prohibited from marrying one another. Although some of the Commonwealth statutory standards are more detailed than others, and different statutes formulate the standard
differently, they are all aiming at the same general requirement: The
partners’ behavior must demonstrate enough of a commitment toward
one another to justify declaring that they are married in fact.
Some of the Commonwealth statutes use the term “marriagelike.”166 But that term is not apt for de facto marriages. If a reference to
marital behavior were to be used, the more apt term would be “idealmarriage-like.” Formal marriages need not, and many would not, meet
the standard for de facto marriages. In addition, some same-sex cohabitants rights advocates object to the “marriage-like” term.167 Most of the
165

The ALI Unmarried Partner Statute departs from this requirement. See ALI UNPARTNER STATUTE, supra note 159, § 6.01(5) & cmt. c.
166 See Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2003 (Qld) § 3 (Austl.);
Family Law Act, R.S.B.C. 2011, c 25 § 3(1)(b) (Can.); Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, c 128, § 1(1) (Can.). See also Family Property Act, R.S.S. 1997, c F-6.3, § 2 (Can.)
(“cohabited . . . as spouses”); Family Maintenance Act, R.S.S. 1990-91, c F-6.2, § 2 (Can.)
(“cohabited . . . as spouses”).
167 See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 27 (1998); Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The
Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL.
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Commonwealth statutes avoid the term. Some use language such as
“living together as a couple on a genuine domestic basis” or just “living
together as a couple.”168 Others use language such as “a relationship of
some permanence, if they are the natural or adoptive parents of a
child.”169 Still others refer to living together in a “conjugal relationship.”170 Some of the statutes require the couple to have lived together
for a certain period of time, such as two or more years171 or for a lesser
period if they have children together.172 The ALI standard is that the
couple must “for a significant period of time share a primary residence
and a life together as a couple.”173
In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, the Australian and New Zealand statutes and the ALI Unmarried Partner Statute
then provide a list of factors to be taken into account. Two features of
all of the statutory lists are that they are not restrictive, meaning that
L. REV. 87, 114-25, 154-60 (2014); E. Gary Spitko, An Accrual/Multi-Factor Approach to
Intestate Inheritance Rights for Unmarried Committed Partners, 81 ORE. L. REV. 255, 32728 (2002).
168 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA(1) (Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act
1984 (NSW) § 4(1) (Austl.); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(1) (Austl.);
Property (Relationships) Act 1976, § 2D(1)(b) (N.Z.); Cohabitation Rights Bill, 2015-16,
HL Bill [29] cl. 1, 2(1)(a) (UK), http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-16/cohabitationrights.html (1st reading June 4, 2015).
169 Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, R.S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3(1) (Can.);
Family Law Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1990, c 18, § 1(1) (Can.); Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c
F.3, § 29 (Can.); Family Law Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F-2.1, § 29(1)(b) (Can.); Family
Maintenance Act, R.S.S. 1990-91, c F-6.2, § 2 (Can.).
170 Family Services Act, R.S.N.B. 1980, c F-2.2, § 1 (Can.); Maintenance & Custody
Act, R.S.N.S 1989, c 160, § 2(aa) (Can.); Family Law Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F-2.1,
§ 29(1)(b) (Can.).
171 See Succession Act 1981 (Qld) pt 1 § 5AA(2)(b)(ii) (Austl.); (“for a continuous
period of at least 2 years ending on the decedent’s death”); Adult Interdependent Relationships Act, R.S.A. 2002, c A-4.5, § 3 (Can.) (“for a continuous period of at least 3
years”); Family Law Act, R.S.B.C. 2011, c 25 § 3(1)(b) (Can.) (“for a continuous period
of at least 2 years”); Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 128, § 1(1) (Can.) (“for a
period of at least 2 years”); Family Maintenance Act, R.S.M. 2015, c F-20 § 1 (Can.) (“for
a period of at least three years”); Family Law Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1990, c 18, § 1(1) (Can.)
(“for a period of at least two years”); Maintenance & Custody Act, R.S.N.S 1989, c 160,
§ 2(aa) (Can.) (“for a period of at least two years”); Family Law Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c F2.1, § 29(1)(b) (Can.) (“continuously for a period of at least three years”); Family Law
Act, R.S.O. 1990, c F.3, § 29(a) (Can.) (“continuously for a period of not less than three
years”); Family Property Act, R.S.S. 1997, c F-6.3, § 2 (Can.) (“continuously for a period
of not less than two years”); Family Maintenance Act, R.S.S. 1990-91, c F-6.2, § 2 (Can.)
(“continuously for a period of not least than two years”); UK Cohabitation Rights Bill,
2015-16, HL Bill [29] cl. 1, § 2(2)(d) (UK) (“for a continuous period of three years or
more”).
172 Family Maintenance Act, R.S.M. 2015, c F-20 § 1 (Can.) (for a period of at least
one year [if] they are together the parents of a child”).
173 ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra note 159, § 6.03(1).
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factors not on the list can be taken into account, and are not conjunctive, meaning that not all of the factors have to be present. Most of the
statutes that do not require cohabitation for a certain period of time list
the duration of the cohabitation as a factor to be considered.174 Most of
the statutes list intermingling of finances and formalizing legal obligations and responsibilities as factors, for example, whether the couple
had a joint checking or other types of accounts, owned property in joint
tenancy, one named the other or both named each other as beneficiary
of life insurance or pension benefit plans, and so on.175 Many of the
statutes list having children as a factor.176 One of the statutes references
a sexual relationship,177 and others take account of the couple’s “reputation and public aspects of the relationship.”178 Again, all of the statutes
are aiming at the same requirement: whether or not the couple’s behavior demonstrates enough of a commitment to one another to declare
that they have become married in fact. The statutes list a miscellany of
other factors, such as the performance of household tasks,179 but the
foregoing are the main ones. Intermingling finances, formalizing legal
obligations, and having children together are important factors not only
because they show that the couple had a strong commitment to one another but also because they are subject to objective evidence.180 These
factors serve another function as well: They protect older widows and
174 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA(2)(a) (Austl.); Property (Relationships)
Act 1984 (NSW) § 4(2)(a) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) pt 1
§ 3A(2)(a) (Austl.); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(2)(b) (Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2D(2)(a) (N.Z.); ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE,
supra note 159, § 6.03(3).
175 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA(2)(d) (Austl.); Property (Relationships)
Act 1984 (NSW) § 4(2)(d)-(e) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) pt 1
§ 3A(2)(d)-(e) (Austl.); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(2)(d)-(e)
(Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2D(2)(d)-(e) (N.Z.); ALI UNMARRIED
PARTNER STATUTE, supra note 159, § 6.03(7)(b).
176 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA(2)(h) (Austl.); Property (Relationships)
Act 1984 (NSW) § 4(2)(g) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) pt 1
§ 3A(2)(g) (Austl.); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(2)(g) (Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2D(2)(g) (N.Z.); ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE,
supra note 159, § 6.03(7)(l). Cf. Family Law Act, R.S.B.C. 2011, c 25 § 3(1)(b)(ii) (Can.)
(“A person is a spouse . . . if the person . . . has a child with the other person.”).
177 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA(2)(c) (Austl.) (“whether a sexual relationship exists”).
178 See Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) § 4AA(2)(i) (Austl.); Property (Relationships)
Act 1984 (NSW) § 4(2)(i) (Austl.); De Facto Relationships Act 1991 (NT) pt 1 § 3A(2)(i)
(Austl.); Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(2)(i) (Austl.); Property (Relationships) Act 1976 § 2D(2)(i) (N.Z.); ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra note
159, § 6.03(7)(i).
179 See, e.g., Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(2)(h) (Austl.).
180 “[C]ohabiting couples pool their funds and share expenses just as married couples
do.” D’Vera Cohn, Cohabiting Couples and Their Money, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 22,
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widowers who began cohabiting later in life, especially those who have
adult children by prior marriages, from being caught up in a de facto
marriage against their wishes. Older cohabiting couples will not have
children together and are more likely to keep their finances separate.181
As explained later, cohabitating couples, including older widows and
widowers, would also be free to enter into a Cohabitation Agreement
that states an intent not to be treated as married.182
Drawing on these Commonwealth, ALI, and other sources,183 as
well as on the case law noted supra in Part II.B.2, I would like to put
forward for discussion a Draft De Facto Marriage Act:
Draft De Facto Marriage Act
Section 1. [De Facto Marriage; De Facto Spouses; Consequences.] For purposes of all statutes in this state, two individuals are married to one another in fact if their relationship
meets the requirements of this section. If so, their marriage is
a de facto marriage and they are de facto spouses. A de facto
marriage has the same status as a formal marriage. The parties
to a de facto marriage are spouses. If one of them dies, the
survivor is the decedent’s surviving spouse.
Section 2. [De Facto Marriage; Requirements.] To be married de facto, the individuals must (i) be unmarried adults; (ii)
not be prohibited from marrying each other under the law of
this state by reason of a blood relationship; and (iii) must be or
have been sharing a common household in a committed
relationship.
Section 3. [Common Household.] For purposes of sections
2 and 5, “sharing a common household” or “shared a common
household” means that the individuals shared the same place
to live, whether or not one or both had other places to live and
2011), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/11/22/cohabiting-couples-and-their-money/
(last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
181 See, e.g., Sheri Stritof, Tips for Cohabiting Seniors, ABOUT.COM: MARRIAGE,
http://marriage.about.com/cs/cohabitation/a/cohabseniors_2.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2016) (“Do not combine your assets. Keep your bank accounts, brokerage accounts, etc.,
separate.”).
182 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
183 See, e.g., Mathew Fawcett, Taking the Middle Path: Recent Swedish Legislation
Grants Minimal Property Rights to Unmarried Cohabitants, 24 FAM. L.Q. 179, 183-84
(1990) (reporting on Swedish legislation); Stêpieñ-Sporek & Ryznar, supra note 153
(forthcoming 2015) (reporting on Polish legislation). The draft De Facto Marriage Act is
adapted from an intestacy statute I proposed long ago in Waggoner, Marital Property
Rights in Transition, supra note 83, at 79-80. Other scholars subsequently built upon that
intestacy proposal. See T.P. Gallanis, Inheritance Rights for Domestic Partners, 79 TUL.
L. REV. 55, 87-91 (2004); Spitko, supra note 167, at 345-49.
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whether or not one or both were physically residing somewhere else at the time in question. The right to occupy the
common household need not have been in both of their names.
Section 4. [Committed Relationship; Factors.] For purposes of section 2, a “committed relationship” is a relationship
in which two individuals have chosen to share one another’s
lives in a long-term and intimate relationship of mutual caring.
Although no single factor or set of factors determines whether
a relationship qualifies as committed, the following factors are
among those to be considered:
(1) the purpose, duration, constancy, and degree of
exclusivity of the relationship;
(2) the degree to which the individuals intermingled
their finances, such as by maintaining joint checking, credit
card, or other types of accounts, sharing loan obligations, sharing a mortgage or lease on the household in which they lived or
on other property, or titling the household in which they lived
in joint tenancy;
(3) the degree to which the individuals formalized legal obligations, intentions, and responsibilities to one another,
such as one or both naming the other as primary beneficiary of
life insurance or employee benefit plans, as agent to make
health care decisions, or as a significant beneficiary of a will or
trust;
(4) whether the couple shared in parenting a child
and the degree of joint caring and support given the child; and
(5) the degree to which the individuals held themselves out to others as married or the degree to which the individuals held themselves out to others as emotionally and
financially committed to one another on a permanent basis.
Section 5. [Presumption.] Two individuals are presumed to
be or have been in a committed relationship if they shared a
common household with their minor child for a continuous period totaling [four] or more years. A child is “their child” if the
child is treated as their child under the law of this [state]. The
presumption can only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
The Draft Act is a comprehensive de facto marriage act, not restricted to dissolution, succession, or any other purpose. Without an obvious limiting principle that would justify a narrower scope, the Draft

Spring 2015]

MARRIAGE AND COHABITATION

89

Act proceeds on the basis that committed partners who are married in
fact for one purpose are married in fact for all purposes.184
The Draft uses the term “committed relationship” instead of “marriage-like relationship.” By necessity, however, the Draft Act uses the
term “de facto marriage.” There is a vast patchwork of state and federal
statutes that grant benefits and impose obligations in cases of “marriage.” As of 2004, federal law alone had 1138 statutory provisions that
condition benefits, rights, and privileges on “marriage.”185 It would be a
near-impossible task to persuade the federal and state legislatures to
amend all of those statutes to say “marriage or committed relationship.”
Another possibility would be to propose a general statute providing that
wherever a statute uses the term “marriage” or “spouses,” the term includes committed relationships as defined in the statute.186 While enacting such a statute at the state level might be possible, persuading
Congress to move on such a statute would be very difficult. For now,
my conclusion is that if a couple in a committed relationship is to acquire the benefits of marriage under both state and federal law, the statute has to deem the couple to be “married.”
The Draft Act does not force de facto marriage on a couple who
wish to cohabit without marriage. Before or during cohabitation, such a
couple can avoid de facto marriage as well as common-law marriage by
entering into a Cohabitation Agreement that states that they are cohabiting or intend to cohabit but do not intend to be treated as married by
any statute or by the common law. A Cohabitation Agreement should
be valid and enforceable so long as its execution meets the informedconsent and other safeguards or a premarital or marital agreement.187
What about couples who want to cohabit without marriage but for
one reason or another have not entered into a Cohabitation Agreement? I noted earlier that the time may come when a couple’s behavior
accumulates enough to reach a tipping point—the time when a court of
competent jurisdiction could justifiably declare the couple’s relationship
as having reached committed status. The Draft Act, however, along
with the Commonwealth statutes and the ALI Unmarried Partner Stat184 Accord Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) pt 8 § 32DA (Austl.); Cohabitation
Rights Bill, 2015-16, HL Bill [29] (UK).
185 See Letter from Gen. Accounting Office (GAO), to Sen. Bill Frist (Jan. 23, 2004),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf. An earlier report found 1049 such statutory
provisions. See Letter from GAO to Rep. Henry Hyde 1-2 (Jan. 31, 1997), http://www
.gao.gov/archive/1997/og97016.pdf. Attached to both letters are lists of the statutory provisions by section numbers and topics.
186 Although that is the approach in Queensland, see Acts Interpretation Act 1954
(Qld) pt 8 § 32DA(6) (Austl.), enacting that approach would be far more difficult in the
federal and state system of the United States.
187 See supra note 96.
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ute, does not, and probably should not, provide a mechanism for automatically declaring the couple as married in fact right then. Even
without a Cohabitation Agreement, a cohabitating couple who deliberately declines to marry should not have their decision overridden. Consequently, the Draft Act is not set up to be self-executing. A court
judgment is required.188 Even though a court judgment would probably
be obtainable at the tipping point, a cohabiting couple in a harmonious
committed relationship would not likely seek one. If such a couple decided that they want to qualify for all federal as well as state benefits
and obligations of marriage, they would just get married.
The Draft Act, as it currently stands, is silent regarding whether a
de facto marriage becomes effective on the date of the judgment or on
an earlier date.189 Whether the Draft Act should expressly allow or prohibit a retroactive judgment or should leave the question to the discretion of the court is debatable. A couple who had reached the tipping
point before the date of the judgment might benefit from a judgment
that they were married ex ante, so that, for example, previous gifts from
one to the other qualified for the federal gift tax marital deduction190 or
that previous filings of joint income tax returns191 were lawful. Failing
to file a gift tax return or filing a false income tax return could expose
the couple to civil or criminal penalties.192 Whether a retroactive de
facto marriage judgment would be a defense is not clear. In a decadesold revenue ruling regarding common-law marriages, which, so far as it
goes, should be equally applicable to de facto marriages, the Internal
Revenue Service was frustratingly imprecise regarding whether a judgment is even required.193 Surely, in the case of a de facto marriage
188 In Estate of Bosch, the Supreme Court held that the Internal Revenue Service
must honor judgments of a state’s highest court, but it need only give “proper regard” to
judgments of lower state courts. Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
189 In comparison, the British Columbia Family Law Act provides: “A relationship
. . . begins on the date on which they begin to live together in a marriage-like relationship.” Family Law Act, R.S.B.C. 2011, c 25 § 3(3) (Can.).
190 See I.R.C. § 2523.
191 See I.R.C. §§ 1(a), 6013-15. The Internal Revenue Service does not require proof
of marriage from couples filing joint income tax returns.
192 See I.R.C. §§ 6672, 6702, 7203, 7206.
193 Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60-61. The ruling is unusual, because the analysis
was not based on a statement of facts. A statement of facts would presumably have
indicated whether the couple had obtained a common-law marriage judgment. In a later
ruling recognizing same-sex marriages for federal tax purposes, Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 201338 I.R.B. 201, 204, the Service reaffirmed the 1958 ruling on common-law marriages. The
2013 ruling, however, was as imprecise as the 1958 ruling regarding whether a commonlaw marriage judgment is required. The Service offered only the conclusory description
of couples who had “entered into” or “established” common-law marriages. Anecdotally, a couple of messages on file with the author posted on the ACTEC listserv dated 1021-15 from practitioners in a common-law marriage state (Texas) indicate that the IRS
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claim, the Service would not take the couple’s word for it or make its
own independent determination regarding such a matter on a case-bycase basis. Here is what the Service said about common-law marriages:
The marital status of individuals as determined under state law
is recognized in the administration of the Federal income tax
laws. Therefore, if applicable state law recognizes commonlaw marriages, the status of individuals living in such relationship that the state would treat them as husband and wife is, for
Federal income tax purposes, that of husband and wife.
The foregoing position of the Internal Revenue Service with
respect to a common-law marriage is equally applicable in the
case of taxpayers who enter into a common-law marriage in a
state which recognizes such relationship and who later move
into a state in which a ceremony is require to initiate the marital relationship. . . . Also, for the purpose of filing a joint income tax return under section 6013(a) of the Code, a commonlaw wife in a state which recognizes such marriages will be considered to be the taxpayer’s spouse.
Just as a high percentage of formal marriages eventually unravel,194
a similar or higher percentage of non-marital committed relationships
will also eventually unravel. A couple who amicably break up after cohabiting in a relationship that could be deemed by a court to be a de
facto marriage would not have a divorce remedy imposed on them.
They would be free to disentangle their relationship without interference from a court under a de facto marriage act. But if one partner
deprives the other of marital rights to which the other feels entitled, a de
facto marriage act would provide a remedy. If they break up, the plaintiff would be able to seek alimony195 and a property settlement196 under
the divorce laws.197 If one of them dies, the plaintiff would be able to
did not question a federal estate-tax marital deduction claimed on the decedent’s estate
tax return when the return was accompanied by a statement explaining the facts supporting their marriage at common law.
194 See MARRIAGE IN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 67 (“The American divorce rate
today is about twice that of 1960, but has declined since hitting its highest point in our
history in the early 1980s. For the average couple marrying for the first time in recent
years, the lifetime probability of divorce or separation now falls between 40 and 50
percent.”).
195 For federal income tax purposes, alimony is ordinary income taxable to the recipient (I.R.C. § 61(a)(8)), and deductible by the payor (I.R.C. § 215).
196 For federal income tax purposes, no gain or loss is recognized on a transfer of
property incident to a divorce, but the transferee takes the transferor’s adjusted basis.
See I.R.C. § 1041(a)-(b).
197 In refining the Draft Act, consideration should be given to possible differences in
divorce laws and to the handling and possible recharacterization of separate property as
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seek an intestate or forced share under state law and an estate tax marital deduction198 under federal law. The plaintiff would have the burden
of persuasion in these cases, except that the presumption in section 5 of
the Draft Act would reverse that burden regarding the existence of a
committed relationship. To benefit from the presumption, the plaintiff
would first have to prove the set of facts that the statute requires as a
precondition: that the couple continuously shared a common household
with their minor child for the requisite number of years. Living together
with their child in a common household for a continuous period is a
strong indication that the couple has crossed the line into de facto marriage.199 The Draft Act defines “their child” as a child who is treated as
their child by applicable state law. That could be a genetic or adopted
child or a child resulting from assisted reproduction or a surrogacy arrangement.200 There could be and often would be more than one such
child, of course,201 but one is all the statute requires to trigger the
presumption.
A divorced de facto spouse and a surviving de facto spouse could
also apply for Social Security benefits. A divorced spouse who is unmarried and age 62 or older is entitled to benefits, but only if the marriage lasted ten years or longer,202 raising in another context the
question of a retroactive de facto marriage judgment. A surviving
spouse is entitled to retirement benefits as early as age 60 if the deceased spouse worked long enough under Social Security to have re-

marital property between equitable distribution states and community property states.
See, e.g., ALI UNMARRIED PARTNER STATUTE, supra note 159, § 6.04(3) & cmt. b.
198 See I.R.C. § 2056.
199 In A Parent-Partner Status for American Family Law by Merle H. Weiner, the
author proposes that state law recognize a new “parent-partner” status for married and
unmarried couples that automatically begins upon birth of a common child and terminates when the child reaches the age of majority. The “parent-partner” status would
legally obligate each parent, whether or not cohabiting with the other parent (1) “to
render reasonable assistance if the other parent’s life is endangered;” (2) “not to physically or psychologically abuse the other parent;” (3) “to engage in ‘relationship work’ at
the transition to parenthood and at the demise of the romantic relationship;” (4) “to act
honestly and fairly when contracting with each other about an aspect of their family relationship;” and (5) “to ‘give or share,’ so that neither parent would perform an unfairly
disproportionate amount of caregiving for the couple’s child.” MERLE H. WEINER, A
PARENT-PARTNER STATUS FOR AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 133, 135 (2015). I thank Professor Weiner for drawing my attention to her book.
200 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-115 to 2-122 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
201 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
202 See Retirement Planner: If You Are Divorced, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa
.gov/planners/retire/divspouse.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2016).
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ceived retirement benefits.203 For near or below poverty-line couples,204
Social Security benefits might be the main asset worth fighting for.
There is no danger that de facto marriages would replace or discourage formal marriages, any more than recognition of common-law
marriages has discouraged formal marriage.205 In the case of formal
marriage, the marriage certificate automatically grants full marital rights
to the married partners. Legislation granting that same status to unmarried partners would still require case-by-case adjudication to determine
whether the criteria have been satisfied.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the marriage and cohabitation trends continue—downward for
marriage, upward for cohabitation—or even if the trends stabilize at the
current rates or reverse somewhat due to same-sex marriages or a dramatically improved economy sometime in the future, the lack of marital
rights for committed partners will persist as a problem until a solution is
found. Pressure could grow for a legislative blueprint for gaining those
rights, especially as more and more aggrieved partners seek a remedy
when they break up or when one dies without benefitting the survivor.
Commonwealth countries have already moved on the subject206 and
Parliament in the United Kingdom has it under consideration.207 In this
country, the ALI has put its prestige behind a remedy for the breakingup cases208 and scholars are now taking notice of the problem.209 A Uniform De Facto Marriage Act that grants de facto marriages the same
status as formal marriages would entitle de facto spouses to all marital
rights under federal as well as state laws.210

203 See Survivors Planner: If You Are the Worker’s Widow or Widower, SOC. SEC.
ADMIN., http://www.socialsecurity.gov/planners/survivors/ifyou2.html (last visited Jan. 20,
2016).
204 See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 129-131 & tbl 3.
206 See supra notes 155-157.
207 See supra note 158.
208 See supra note 159.
209 See supra note 154.
210 See supra text accompanying notes 44-54.

